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ABSTRACT 
Protecting America from terrorism, natural disasters, and other threats has never been 
more important or as complex an endeavor as it is today. From asymmetrical warfare to 
economic meltdown, the environments are increasingly unstable, dynamic, and complex, 
yet many U.S. homeland security organizations are designed around a 19th century model 
created for the Industrial Age. Information Age challenges demand new ideas for 
organizational design. Traditional mechanistic and hierarchical bureaucracies must be re-
examined. 
This thesis explores case studies that include an intelligence organization fighting 
bioterrorism and a military unit battling insurgents in asymmetrical warfare. Case Study 
research was selected to examine “how” and “why” questions related to organic 
organizational design in dynamic and complex environments.  
Organic designs provide a better fit because they leveraged three critical 
capabilities for these environments: communication dissemination, sense-making, and 
timely conversion of information to action. This fit is accomplished through elements, 
such as decentralized decision authority, emergent leadership, low specialization, low 
formalization, use of liaisons, and a reliance on performance controls, which in turn, 
contribute to decentralized allocation of decision rights, unconstrained patterns of 
interaction, and broad distribution of information. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
United States (U.S.) homeland security organizations routinely address issues in 
unstable, dynamic, and complex environments, where change can be rapid, unexpected, 
and adaptive. These complex environments exhibit uncertainty, emergence, and non-
linearity. Traditional mechanistic and hierarchical organizational designs common to 
bureaucracies are not well suited to perform in such environments (Wise, 2002, p. 132). 
Some of the concerns that confront the homeland security enterprise include urban 
transportation networks, the power grid, expansive computer networks, transnational 
criminal and terrorist organizations, and U.S. economic infrastructure. Addressing these 
concerns includes the protection of people, places, institutions, and infrastructure, while 
detecting, disrupting, and preventing threats; and where appropriate, bringing adversaries 
to justice. The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR, 2010) defines the 
homeland security enterprise as, “…the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of 
federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners…” 
charged with the protection of America from terrorism, natural disasters, and a variety of 
other threats and vulnerabilities. The bureaucratic organizations that comprise the 
homeland security enterprise guard America from the potential dangers of complex, 
unpredictable, and emergent self-organizing systems—complex adaptive systems. These 
systems exhibit a large number of heterogeneous and interacting elements, which make 
them difficult to analyze and understand (Carafano & Weitz, 2009, pp. 1–2; Axelrod & 
Cohen, 2000, pp. 7, 15). The unstable, dynamic, and complex environments generated by 
these systems often challenge the effectiveness and design of homeland security 
organizations.  
Government bureaucracies are typically hierarchical organizations with 
centralized decision rights, concentrated organizational knowledge, narrow distribution of 
information, and constrained interaction among members. These organizations are often 
visually depicted diagrammatically on an organizational chart as a hierarchy. Many of  
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these organizations lack agility and a capacity for uncertainty and are commonly 
characterized as “mechanistic” (Alberts & Nissen, 2009; Tushman & Nadler, 1978; 
Mintzberg, 1979). 
Hierarchical organizational design was developed during the Industrial Age in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. This design focused on organizational efficiency (Daft, 
2009, p. 23; Dooley, 1997, p. 70; Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. 37). Hierarchies have several 
advantages, including a clear concept of reporting relationships, authority, and 
organizational accountability. Organizations structured around a hierarchical form make 
use of specialization, division of labor, and coordination in pursuit of organizational goals 
(Daft, 2009, pp. 23–25, 90; Alberts & Hayes, 2003, pp. 41–43; Tucker, 2008, p. 3). This 
design was well suited for a time when a Newtonian, linear, and mechanized approach 
was the contemporary paradigm. The “machine” was the metaphor that shaped 
organizational design. Government organizations adopted hierarchical structure, which 
added approval layers and required that communication flow up through those layers, 
while decisions flowed from the top down (Tucker, 2008, pp. 3–4). This communication 
and approval path slowed organizational capacity to covert information into action. 
Hierarchies, therefore, exhibit poor capacity to change priorities or shift organizational 
resources quickly to meet a rapidly changing environment—the unstable, dynamic, and 
complex environment routinely encountered in homeland security. Government 
dependence on the hierarchical design has inhibited organizational agility (Kiel, 1994, pp. 
1–6; Alberts & Hayes, 2003, pp. 72–75, 215). 
In addition to the lack of organizational agility, hierarchical organizations are 
often unable to change tactics or processes to meet a changing domain—adaptability. 
This lack of organizational agility and adaptability stifle an organization’s ability to use 
information to anticipate issues, which produces a more reactive mode of operation. An 
illustration of this problem in homeland security has been observed in some of its 
intelligence agencies, which rely on timely and accurate information about emerging 
threats. In recent times, intelligence agencies have struggled to keep pace with the 
changing threats related to terrorism. Corman asserts that hierarchical organizations are  
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not well designed to deal with the adaptive nature of one aspect of terrorist organizations 
(Corman, 2005). He contends that terrorist organizations are in fact adaptive networks 
and a networked approach is required to combat them. 
U.S. intelligence agencies did not anticipate the adaptation of al-Qaeda from a 
central command structure to the current collection of regional franchises and al-Qaeda 
inspired movements. Intelligence organizations also did not adjust well to the terrorists’ 
adaptation of targeting and tactics. The thwarted, but nearly successful attack on 
Northwest Airlines flight 253, is a salient example of this issue. Nigerian-born Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to down an airliner by detonating a bomb concealed in 
his underwear. Only the quick action of alert passengers prevented the attack. 
Abdulmutallab was inspired by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) figure Anwar 
al-Awlaki and attended training at a camp in Yemen. U.S. intelligence personnel from 
various agencies had received information about Abdulmutallab and could have added 
him to the “no-fly list,” but information stovepipes prevented the necessary 
communication exchange to identify him as a threat (Hosenball, 2010; DeYoung, 2009). 
This incident was an instance in which the government’s hierarchical and mechanistic 
bureaucracies impeded information flow and failed to interact effectively. 
This kind of communication failure is not new. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent in the Phoenix field office noticed 
peculiarities regarding flight school students and sent a memorandum informing FBI 
headquarters. Around the same time, agents in the Minneapolis field office began an 
investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui after a flight school reported his unusual behavior 
while attending lessons. In both cases, the FBI hierarchy did not accept or follow the 
recommendations of the agents, and the FBI personnel in Phoenix and Minneapolis were 
unaware of the cases in the other respective cities (Keane & Hamilton, 2004, pp. 272–
276; Rowley, 2002). The hierarchical structure and rigid information and approval 
protocol in the FBI simply did not allow for decentralized communication flow. 
Government organizations are often characterized as inflexible, cumbersome, 
overly large, unwieldy, and in some cases, obsolete (Kamarck, 2002, p. 6). Their 
hierarchical design is based on the Industrial Age models, which are not compatible with 
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contemporary concepts of agility and adaptability. Hierarchies are likely to fail in the 
complex adaptive environments of the Information Age (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. 56). 
Today’s challenges negate previously held assumptions of predictability, order, and 
certainty, and require flexibility and adaptability (Daft, 2009, p. 30). Alberts and Hayes 
considered the problem of organizational hierarchies in the complex adaptive 
environment of the Information Age:  
Industrial Age organizations are, by their very nature, anything but agile. 
Agile organizations must be able to meet unexpected challenges, to 
accomplish tasks in new ways, and to learn to accomplish new tasks. Agile 
organizations cannot be stymied when confronted by uncertainty or fall 
apart when some of their capabilities are interrupted or degraded. Agile 
organizations need to be able to tolerate (even embrace) disruptive 
innovation. Agile organizations depend upon the ability of individual 
members and organizational entities to get the information that they need 
to make sense of a situation and to combine and recombine as needed to 
ensure coherent responses. (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, pp. 59–60) 
The concept of the large, unwieldy government bureaucracy can be illustrated in 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—the largest organization in the homeland 
security enterprise. DHS has 220,000 employees distributed among 22 agencies. The 
department has an annual budget of 52 billion dollars (Homeland Security on the 
Hustings, 2008; DHS: Progress and Priorities II, 2008). 
Hierarchical and mechanistic design has evolved around a reductionist view, in 
which challenges were well understood and solutions could be reached by breaking a 
problem down into its component parts. Dooley theorized that these ideas of 
reductionism, determinism, and equilibrium were based on the metaphor of management 
as a machine (Dooley, 1997, pp. 70–76). These assumptions helped to develop the 
modern management concepts of division of labor, standard operating procedures, and 
the organizational chart (Dooley, 1997, pp. 70–76). Complex adaptive systems, such as 
terrorist networks, often confound reductionism. 
The concept of organizational design is not limited to a visual depiction on an 
organizational chart, but includes the interaction of various processes that work within 
the structure. These processes include how organizational members interact, 
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communicate, and make decisions. The combination of processes and structure 
determines how an organization is oriented, or how it is aligned and adapts within it 
environment—orientation. Organizational orientation can be broadly categorized between 
two general extremes—mechanistic and organic (Mintzberg, 1979). Mechanistic 
organizations are formalized, rigidly standardized, specialized, and bureaucratic, with a 
centralized command structure. This organizational form is most often associated with 
government bureaucracy. Organic forms are generally decentralized, with lateral 
interaction and distributed communication (Mintzberg, 1979). This research could have 
focused on the structural component by comparing hierarchical design to networked 
structure, but the more meaningful examination concerns the impact of mechanistic and 
organic design characteristics in unstable, dynamic, and complex environments.  
An extensive body of literature and empirical research related to organizational 
principles exists, including mechanistic and organic designs. This body of work is often 
referred as “organization and management theory” (OMT). The OMT literature suggests 
that no single organizational design is optimal in all situations, nor do all designs perform 
with equal effectiveness. The relationship between design and situational variables is 
critical (Galbraith, 1973, pp. 2–6; Galbraith, 1977, p. 28; Mintzberg, 1979, p. 11). This is 
the widely accepted concept known as contingency theory, which proposes that an 
organization must have the correct “fit” for its environment (Burns & Stalker, 2001; 
Woodward, 1981; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). One concept that is well supported in 
contingency theory is that organic organizational forms perform well in unstable—
dynamic—and complex environments, while mechanistic designs are effective in stable 
and simple domains (Burns & Stalker, 2001; pp. 119–125; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, p. 
188; Galbraith, 1973, p. 2; Galbraith, 1977, pp. 28–29; Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 270–277). 
Since the homeland security environment can be characterized in some situations as 
unstable, dynamic, and complex, in other words, a high degree of uncertainty, ambiguity, 
and non-linearity exists, with conditions changing quickly and often, the discussion of 
mechanistic and organic designs is a relevant one. 
The apparent lack of organizational effectiveness associated with the 9/11 attacks 
and the Abdulmutallab case supports the assertion that homeland security organizations, 
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which are generally considered to be mechanistic, do not perform well in unstable, 
dynamic, and complex environments. Examination of this problem goes beyond a 
comparison of mechanistic and organic design. The salient question here is why do 
organic designs perform better in unstable, dynamic, and complex environments, and 
how does this happen? 
Since unstable, dynamic, and complex environments exhibit rapid change, 
adaptation, uncertainty, unpredictability, and non-linearity, they require organizations 
that can collect and disseminate information rapidly and efficiently, can make sense of 
the situation quickly, and can convert that knowledge into timely and appropriate action. 
In this research, organizational performance is evaluated based on the ability to meet 
mission objectives, collect and disseminate accurate information at a tempo consistent 
with the environment, acquire shared situational awareness, promote organizational 
learning, and make timely and appropriate decisions to covert information into action and 
synchronize organizational efforts. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary Question 
Why do organic organizational designs perform well in unstable, dynamic, and 
complex environments? 
2. Secondary Questions 
How do organic organizational designs perform well in unstable, dynamic, and 
complex environments? 
This thesis examines homeland security organizations operating in unstable, 
dynamic and complex environments to understand why and how a particular set of 
organizational characteristics associated with organic designs also contributes to 
performance in such environments. 
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C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This research proposes that organizational characteristics, elements, and variables 
generally associated with organic organizational design also contribute to performance in 
unstable, dynamic, and complex environments. Based on this proposition, it is anticipated 
that those characteristics can be identified from a review of the literature and an 
examination of actual case studies in which organic organizations operated in unstable, 
dynamic, and complex environments. 
This research seeks to support this general framework and to identify the specific 
characteristics for a better understanding of why and how organic forms perform well in 
such environments. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research attempts to support the literature, which has established the concept 
of organizational fit and that organic designs perform well in unstable, dynamic, and 
complex environments. This research also seeks to explain why this occurs and how it 
works in practice. 
Homeland security organizations that operate in unstable, dynamic, and complex 
environments can benefit from this research, by assessing the need to modify 
organizational design to meet varying degrees of instability and complexity. Intelligence 
agencies, military units, and public safety organizations tasked with the prevention of and 
response to terrorist attacks will better understand the nexus between organic 
organizational characteristics and the capacity to adapt and respond in unstable, dynamic, 
and complex environments. 
Homeland security leaders can use this research as a foundation to implement 
policy that supports future development and assessment of organic organizational 
characteristics. It can be used as a guide to move organizational design to be more 
organic as the environment becomes more dynamic and complex, and to inform 
homeland security organizations better about why and how organic designs perform in 
unstable, dynamic, and complex environments. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The intent of this review of the literature is to provide a better understanding of 
why and how organic organizational designs perform well in unstable, dynamic, and 
complex environments. Meaningful observation and assessment of the relationship 
between organizational design and performance first requires some foundational 
understanding of the basic underlying concepts. For the purposes of this examination, the 
term “environment” is generally the surrounding, setting, or condition in which people 
and organizations perform particular activities. Specifically in this case, the organizations 
are homeland security organizations, and the activities performed are related to the 
detection, disruption, prevention, mitigation, response to, and recovery from terrorist 
attacks, natural disasters, and other threats to our security. Complex adaptive systems will 
be further described in detail in Section A of this review, but for now they can be 
described as non-linear, dynamic systems, which can be unstable and generally exhibit 
emergent properties. Therefore, for the purposes of this examination, complex adaptive 
environments are generally understood as non-linear, dynamic, and often unstable 
surroundings, settings, or conditions in which people and organizations perform 
particular activities, and where emergent properties, uncertainty, and unexpected rapid 
change are common. 
This literature review establishes a foundational understanding of complex 
adaptive systems and organizational design theory, which is followed by an examination 
of recurrent ideas and some concepts on how homeland security organizations can 
perform effectively in emergent, uncertain, and complex domains. 
In the opening Section A, the literature is synthesized to provide insight on the 
fundamentals of complex adaptive systems and complexity theory. A working definition 
of complex adaptive systems is developed to the degree that a single definition can be 
expressed to describe the phenomena fully. Section B focuses on complex adaptive 




environment. The emergent and adaptive nature of complex systems generates unique 
challenges and establishes an environment of uncertainty for homeland security 
organizations. This section explores some of those challenges. 
Section C explores organization from a structural view, where reporting authority 
and linkages define its design—topology. This section also examines a more conceptual 
and process-oriented perspective of organization, in which allocation of decision rights, 
patterns of interaction, distribution of information, specialization of labor, and systems 
thinking shape design—typology. Section D is an introduction to organizational design 
and identifies schools of thought and various organizational forms, including some 
specific designs deemed particularly relevant to this analysis. 
The final two sections investigate potentially suitable organizational 
characteristics in complex adaptive environments and a detailed look at networked vs. 
hierarchical structures.  
A. COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS 
John H. Holland is considered by many to be among a small group of researchers 
responsible for the term, Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). Holland and his colleagues 
at the Santa Fe Institute proposed a theory that this world is permeated with various 
collections of adaptive and interactive agents that function within networks using simple 
sets of conditional rules that emerge as complex systems (Waldrop, 1992; Miller & Page, 
2007). Most CAS authors use the term agent (Waldrop, 1992; Holland, 1995; Axelrod & 
Cohen, 2000) or actor having agency (Page, 2011, p. 250). Common dictionary 
definitions of agent include someone or something capable of producing an effect. 
Holland (1995) said that he “borrowed the term agent from economics” because it “is 
descriptive, but avoids preconceptions” (p. 7). Axelrod and Cohen (2000) said that an 
agent …“has the ability to interact with its environment, including other agents” (p. 4). 
An agent could be anything from a person in a social system to an animal in an 
ecosystem. Agents could be computers on a network or grains of sand in a sand pile. In 
physiological systems, agents could be one of the hundreds of millions of neurons  
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performing thousand of simultaneous interactions in fractions of a second or self-
organizing anti-bodies that fight a host of invading and ever-changing viruses (Waldrop, 
1992; Holland, 1995; Lewis, 2006; Miller & Page, 2007; Page, 2011). 
Beyond their basic description as networks of interactive agents, complex 
adaptive systems are nonlinear and adaptive. Brand (2009) characterized a nonlinear 
phenomenon where the “…output is not always proportional to its input—that, 
occasionally, unexpected, tiny changes in initial conditions provoke huge responses” (p. 
9). Holland (1995) said that nonlinearity could be thought of as the whole being greater 
than the value of its parts (pp. 15–22). Thus, the agents can adapt in unexpected ways 
beyond a logical proportion to input. The results are emergence, self-organization, and 
uncertainty. 
Holland uses the example of the game of chess, which features a game board with 
64 squares and 16 game pieces per player. With a set of only two-dozen conditional rules, 
the number of possible game variations grows exponentially with each move (Holland, 
1998, p. 1). One researcher estimated the possible number of chess game variations at 
10,000,000,00050, but no precisely known number of game variations exists (Hardy, 
1999, p. 17; Wolfram Math World). The salient point is that the interaction of moves 
among the game pieces [agents] creates huge variation and complexity. Chess provides a 
practical illustration of a complex adaptive system. 
Bodhanya (2010) stated, “a complex adaptive system is a system comprised of 
heterogeneous agents that interact locally with each other based on local schema, such 
that the behavior of the system arises as a result of feedback relationships between the 
agents, and the system evolves as the schemata of the agents adapt based on the 
feedback.” Bodhanya echoed the arguments of Holland and other researchers that 
complex adaptive systems exhibit emergence, adaptation, and uncertainty. 
Much of the literature uses the metaphor of the sand pile to describe the CAS 
phenomenon. In 1987, physicist Per Bak conducted a series of experiments with piles of 
sand to demonstrate the emergence of organized instability, or critical state, in which a 
single grain of sand added to the pile can cause a massive avalanche or no reaction at all 
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(Bak, 1996; Axelrod & Cohen, 2000, p. 105; Waldrop, 1992, pp. 304–306). Lewis (2011) 
goes into some depth on the 1987 Bak, Tang, and Weisenfeld (BTW) sand pile 
experiments. Lewis uses the term self-organized criticality (SOC) to describe this tipping 
point when complex systems are susceptible to catastrophe (pp. 9–26). 
Dooley, Bodhanya, and many other authors use the term schema to describe the 
complex model in which agents interact. Dooley (1996) suggests that the agents strive for 
“fitness” within a schema, and this quest for fitness causes mutation, adaptation, and 
ultimate emergence from simplicity to complexity (p. 3).  
Holland and the team at Santa Fe saw the implications of complexity science and 
complex adaptive systems not only in biological and natural systems, but also in 
economics, computer networks, sociology, psychology, and a wide array of human social 
interaction. They developed theories applicable to many aspects of modern life (Waldrop, 
1992; Holland, 1995).  
B. COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS IN HOMELAND SECURITY: THE 
CHALLENGES 
Bellavita (2006) stated, “…that the most significant strategic issues the homeland 
security community will face in the next ten years are in the unordered domain of 
complex adaptive systems.” Among the phenomena enumerated in Bellavita’s notion of 
that complex domain are terrorism, pandemics, nonstate threats, technology, networks, 
and resilience (pp. 8–9). Lewis also draws a connection between complex adaptive 
systems and homeland security. In describing the tipping point of complex adaptive 
systems, known as self-organized criticality (SOC), Lewis suggests that the SOC model 
can be used to study terrorist attacks, earthquakes, oil spills, power outages, and financial 
collapses (2011, p. 16). 
Carafano and Weitz (2009) said that an understanding of complex systems was a 
requisite capacity for homeland security organizations. They listed national security 
concerns, such as terrorism, border security, and the protection of financial markets, as 
examples of complex phenomena (pp. 2–3). Beyond their partial list of complex issues  
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that influence the homeland security environment, Carafano and Weitz echo a common 
theme in the literature that local decisions in one part of the system can have unintended 
and unexpected consequences system-wide (pp. 2–3).  
Much of the literature refers to case studies of al-Qaeda as evidence that terrorist 
organizations form complex adaptive systems. Bellavita specifically named al-Qaeda as a 
“complex homeland security issue” (Bellavita, 2006, p. 9). Al-Qaeda has been described 
as a flexible network that quickly adapts to external threats to its existence (Marion & 
Uhl-Bien, 2003, p. 54). The group’s structure has evolved into a bottom-up coordination 
and exhibits emergent characteristics typical of complex systems (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 
2003, p. 54). Terrorist networks in general present an asymmetrical threat and manifest 
complex adaptive system characteristics (Lichtblau et al., 2006, p. 3; Wise, 2002, p. 132). 
Ahmed, Elgazzar and Hegazi stated emphatically, “it is obvious that terrorism is a CAS” 
(2005, p. 129). Ahmed et al. used an agent-based modeling approach to study al-Qaeda 
and concluded that terrorism must be studied as a whole and that one system can interact 
with another (pp. 4–5). 
Sullivan (2010) added transnational organized crime networks to a growing list of 
threats “adapting and morphing” as they confront U.S. homeland security efforts. These 
groups have adapted to interdiction efforts and appear to continue their adaptation—
blurring the lines between ideological insurgencies, terrorist networks, and organized 
criminal enterprise. Sullivan cites examples of traditional rebel movements and 
ideological insurgencies like FARC in Columbia and Shining Path in Peru, who now 
control drug operations and provide protection for the production facilities. He also refers 
to the burgeoning drug trafficking from Latin American to North Africa to supply Europe 
and how these various groups are becoming networked with each other. He suggests that 
many of these nonstate actors have accumulated such power that they are now on the 
verge of becoming pseudo states. Sullivan uses terms such as, “quasi-state, virtual 
statelets, dual sovereignty, no-go zones, lawless zones, de facto rulers, and parallel 
states.” Many of the Mexican drug cartels have destabilized government authority in 
various regions of Mexico and in other Latin American countries (pp. 180–187).  
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Another facet of the homeland security mission is the protection of critical 
infrastructure. Lewis (2006) described critical infrastructure sectors as, “infinitely 
complex” because of their interdependencies (p. 49). He refers to critical infrastructure as 
“emergent networks” (pp. 94–95). Lewis included power grids, oil pipelines, and 
transportation systems as examples of infrastructure that can be characterized as complex 
adaptive systems (p. 103). In a 2007 unpublished report, Lewis said that much of U.S. 
critical infrastructure is so complex that it is impossible to calculate the range of 
unintended consequences of a natural disaster or manmade incident, (2007, p. 1). The 
cascade failures of the power grid in 1996 and again in 2003 are examples of complexity 
and SOC affecting critical infrastructures (2006, p. 270). The impact on the transportation 
and economic sectors because of the September 11 terrorist attacks is an example of the 
interdependencies inherent in CI sectors (Bram, Orr & Rapaport, 2002; Homer-Dixon, 
2002; Ito & Lee, 2005; Lewis, 2006). 
Keeling and Eames (2005) analyzed epidemiological threats using the same 
network theory that Lewis used to model critical infrastructure. They list pandemic 
influenza and bioterrorist attacks as examples of complex systems that can be modeled as 
networks (pp. 304–305). They claim that these networks exhibit the emergent 
characteristics of complex adaptive systems and present challenges to homeland security 
organizations (pp. 304–305). 
The self-organized critical state of complex adaptive systems as outlined by 
Holland and Lewis, is applied to natural disasters in the book, Ubiquity: Why 
Catastrophes Happen, by Mark Buchanan. Buchanan sites SOC to explain the stresses 
that build in earthquake faults, and ultimately, lead to seismic activity (2001, pp. 53–54) 
and conditions that influence the spread of forest fires (pp. 67–69). These disasters are yet 
more examples of complex issues facing homeland security today. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 
Daft (2009) recognized one way to understand organizational design through the 
creation of hierarchies to achieve “organizational efficiency” (p. 23). He saw one aspect 
of design as a method for establishing reporting relationships and grouping people into 
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organizational units or elements (p. 90). This spatial depiction or topology to describe 
reporting relationships is expressed as a visual diagram—an organizational chart. Some 
of the structural examples of organizational forms outlined by Daft include the 
functional, divisional, multi-focused, team, horizontal, matrix, and networked (pp. 103–
112). The FBI is an example of a functional hierarchy with its investigation, 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence, law enforcement services, and administration 
subsections, which are divided by the functions they perform (Federation of American 
Scientists, 2010). The Federal Emergency Management Agency follows a similar 
concept, but one part of the hierarchy is divided into regions that provide essentially the 
same function (FEMA, 2010), which follows a more divisional model. 
Organizational design is often conceptualized in a purely structural context in the 
literature, which is the visual depiction of the diagrammatical organizational chart in 
which reporting relationships and linkages are expressed. The classic hierarchical 
structure commonly comes to mind in this example. One valid comparison is to contrast 
this structural component and its impact on organizational performance. This thesis 
project began as a comparison of a hierarchical structure to a networked structure. 
Validation in the literature and empirical data does exist to support a finding that 
hierarchical structures perform more optimally in simple environments with less 
uncertainty, while networked structures are better suited for uncertainty and complexity. 
However, organizational design research extends well beyond the understanding of 
organization simply as structure. This literature review exposed the relevance of 
organizational design, when thought of as process. This concept of process is described 
as a general method for interacting, coordinating, communicating, and making decisions. 
In Christensen’s (2003) RPV model (resources—processes—values), resources are 
“transformed” into values and the “patterns of interaction, coordination, communication, 
and decision-making through which this transformation occurs are the processes” (p. 
187). Garvin (1998) had a similar view of processes, which he subdivided into “work, 
behavioral, and change” processes. The behavioral processes comprised interaction, 
communication, and decision-making. In Galbraith’s STAR Model (2001), processes are 
one vital component of design, and in particular, the lateral processes compare to 
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Garvin’s behavioral processes. Therefore, for the purposes of this literature review and 
the forthcoming analysis, the process context of organizational design involves patterns 
of interaction, distribution of information (which includes an implied communication and 
distribution of knowledge), and allocation of decision rights. These variables of design 
were far more relevant to performance and this analysis than structure alone. The 
collective effects of these elements comprise the typology or classification of an 
organization, while the spatial depiction differentiates only its topology. 
D. DESIGNING ORGANIZATIONS: MANY SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
Organizational design and the study of organizations in general—referred to as 
Organization and Management Theory (OMT)—have been extensively examined in the 
literature, using at various times and by different researchers, different terminology, 
nomenclature, and schools of thought, which make meaningful comparison problematic. 
Some of the researchers and theorists include Fayol, Urwick, and Gulick (classical 
school), Mayo and Warner of the Hawthorne Study fame, Roethlisberger, Dickson, and 
Landsberger (human relations school), March, Simon, and Cyert (decision theory school), 
and Weber, Blau, Gouldner, and Crozier (bureaucratic school) to name a few (Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967, pp. 159–184), as well as Leavitt’s diamond (Leavitt, 1965) and 
Galbraith’s STAR (Galbraith, 2002; Kate & Galbraith, 2007). 
Tafoya (2010) classified organizations into four design categories: enterprise, 
community, team, and individual contributor (p. 28). His highly conceptualized notion of 
organizational design does not use the organizational chart. Tafoya contends that most 
organizations are a blend of each of the four classifications with a heavier emphasis on 
one aspect depending on the type of organization and its mission (p. 28). 
The Sloan School of Management at MIT was the genesis of Senge’s notion of 
the “learning organization,” where the systems within an organization came to 
characterize its design and organizational knowledge is more distributed throughout the 
workforce. Senge conceptualized the organization through the lens of systems thinking, 
which considers the entire business process in a holistic way rather than seeing snapshots 
from within compartmentalized structures (Senge, 2006, pp. 6, 65–66). Daft’s version of 
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the “learning organization,” included a flattened structure to align with horizontal 
workflow. It can be modeled as a network because divisional and functional barriers have 
been removed to promote information sharing. Daft also discussed systems thinking and 
a culture of employee empowerment to encourage innovation and adaptation (Daft, 2009, 
pp. 31–34). According to Senge, learning organizations are inherently adaptive, and he 
cites Ford Motor Company’s information technology division and the Singapore police 
force as examples of adaptive organizations that employ learning organization principles 
(pp. 275–280). 
The volume, diversity, and complexity of the various theories, schools of thought, 
terminology, and models abound. Therefore, an exhaustive study OMT for this research 
is impractical, impossible, and unnecessary. 
1. Contingency Theory 
One school of thought in the OMT literature with particular relevance to this 
research is the contingency theory school. Contingency theory includes a set of ideas that 
can contribute to the standardization of terminology, the harmonization of competing 
theories, and a greater understanding of the impact of complexity—in this case, 
environmental complexity—as a variable on the relationship between organizational 
design and performance. Contingency theory is based on the notion that no single 
organizational design is best in all situations and not all designs perform with equal 
effectiveness. The relationship between design and situational variables is critical 
(Galbraith, 1973, pp. 2–6, Galbraith, 1977, p. 28; Mintzberg, 1979, p. 11). However, this 
is not a simple bivariate concept, where design (D) correlates to situation (S). A 
conditional variable (or variables), such as complexity (C) determines how D correlates 
with S; therefore, an example might be that when complexity is high, a particular design 
might perform poorly in a particular situation, but when complexity is low, the inverse 
would be true assuming that the variables D and S are the same. Contingency theory 




understood to be the variable that moderates the effect of organizational design on its 
performance, then the design must have the appropriate fit for the contingency 
(Donaldson, 2001, pp. 1–12; Galbraith, 1973). 
Contingency theory is an accepted body of work within OMT, with a strong 
foundation of empirical research to support its conclusions. Nearly all of the 
contemporary OMT literature cites the seminal writings of Burns and Stalker 
(1961/2001), Woodward (1965/1981), and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), as the origins of 
contingency theory and its premise that no single system of organization is best in all 
circumstances (Alberts & Nissen, 2009). 
One recurrent comparison of design variables that has emerged in contingency 
theory is the mechanistic vs. organic debate. The classical school examined variables, 
such as centralization, formalization, standardization, unity of command, and hierarchical 
structure, which collectively came to be known as mechanistic when a high degree of all 
these elements exists (Burns & Stalker, 2001, pp. 119–120; Galbraith, 1977, pp. 28–29; 
Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 81–94). Organizations that exhibited decentralization, less 
formalization and standardization, a participatory nature, and a networked structure were 
considered to be organic (Burns & Stalker, 2001, pp. 121–125; Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967, p. 188; Galbraith, 1977, pp. 28–29; Mintzberg, 1979, p. 87). Tushman and Nadler 
(1978) referred to this organizational form as “organismic” (p. 617). Some authors use 
terms such as systemic or holistic in a similar fashion to organic. In the general sense, the 
literature described mechanistic organizations in reductionist terms and organic 
organizations in holistic terms.  
Organizational forms do not always fall cleanly into one typology or another. 
Rather, the literature suggests that organizations can exhibit variables drawn from 
varying degrees of these two (mechanistic and organic) archetypes. Mintzberg (1979) 
suggested this concept through his identification of four basic designs: 1) the machine 
bureaucracy, 2) simple structure, 3) professional bureaucracy, and 4) adhocracy. Thus, 
organizational design can be visualized on a continuum where the mechanistic occupies 
one end and the organic is at the other. The machine bureaucracy is at the mechanistic 
end of the spectrum, and the adhocracy occupies the organic end of the continuum. 
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Mintzberg’s other forms are variations, with a mixture of mechanistic and organic 
elements in varying degrees. Alberts and Hayes (2003) and Alberts and Nissen (2009) 
included the edge organization, which occupies a space on the continuum that could be 
characterized as more organic than the adhocracy, so the continuum is expanded to 
include edge organizations at the extreme organic end. 
2. Analysis of Organizational Structures 
In general, contingency theory literature claims that mechanistic organizations 
offer a better fit in stable environments, while organic designs provide superior fit when 
greater uncertainty or rapid change is present (Burns & Stalker, 2001, pp. 119–125; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, p. 188; Galbraith, 1973, p. 4; Galbraith, 1977, pp. 28–29; 
Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 84–94). For the purpose of this research, Galbraith’s (1973) 
definition of uncertainty is used, “…the difference between the amount of information 
required to perform the task and the amount of information already possessed by the 
organization” (p. 5). Since uncertainty is a consistent characteristic of complex 
environments, it is reasonable to infer from the literature that mechanistic forms have a 
better fit in simple environments, and organic forms have better fit in complex 
environments. Mintzberg (1979) specifically supports two hypotheses that reinforce this 
view: 
 “The more dynamic the environment, the more organic the structure” (p. 
270). 
 “The more complex the environment, the more decentralized the 
structure” (p. 273). 
Mintzberg’s analysis contrasts stable environments with dynamic ones and 
complex environments with simple ones. He examines organic and decentralized 
organizational forms against mechanistic and hierarchical designs. He also suggests that 
Galbraith did not go far enough in his characterization of “uncertainty,” for which 




Mintzberg (1979) described the machine bureaucracy as:  
Highly specialized, routine operating tasks, very formalized procedures 
and large-sized units in the operating core, reliance on the functional basis 
for grouping tasks throughout the structure, little use made of training and 
of the liaison devices, relatively centralized power for decision making 
with some use of action planning systems, and an elaborate administrative 
structure with a sharp distinction between line and staff. (p. 315) 
These organizations generally have little horizontal decentralization. Policies, 
standardized procedures, rules, and regulations dominate the organizational structure and 
members adhere strongly to a chain-of-command for communication and decision-
making. Decision rights, information, and organizational knowledge are concentrated at 
the upper management level of the organization, which are classic vertical hierarchies 
with centralized authority—generally better suited for simple and stable environments. 
Large government institutions and manufacturing companies are included as examples of 
this design (Alberts & Nissen, 2009, pp. 315–346). 
The simple structure is typically a small or young organization that relies on 
direct supervision for coordination. The simplicity of this form allows for centralized yet 
responsive decision making through informal interaction and less reliance on training, 
planning, or liaison devices. The simple structure is more organic than the machine 
bureaucracy. Examples of the simple structure include a small retail store or new 
government agency with a strong central leader (Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 305–312; Alberts 
& Nissen, 2009). 
The professional bureaucracy is primarily a decentralized bureaucracy, in which 
homogeneity is achieved through the coordinating mechanism of standardization of 
skills. These organizations employ highly trained specialists—professionals—to perform 
most operational tasks. This level of training and specialization gives members a great 
deal of autonomy in their work. The work is done with little restriction from the 
hierarchy, and specialized members function independently of each other with 
coordination achieved through a standard set of skills, usually established by a regulatory 
body outside the organization. A high level of training is necessary for this model to 
perform effectively. Aside from the skilled professional workforce, many professional 
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bureaucracies utilize a less skilled support staff that functions more as a machine 
bureaucracy. Examples of professional bureaucracies include legal firms, medical groups, 
and schools (Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 348–371; Alberts & Nissen, 2009).  
Mintzberg’s (1979) adhocracy is an organic, decentralized structure with little 
formalization, considerable horizontal job specialization through extensive training, and a 
heavy reliance on liaison devices as a coordinating mechanism. Decision rights are 
distributed, and interaction tends to be peer-to-peer. Adhocracies can bring technical 
experts together from various disciplines to form functional teams, which fosters 
innovation (pp. 431–467; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). 
Alberts and Hayes (2003) developed the concept of the edge organization, which 
is not dissimilar to the learning organization described by Senge and Daft. Edge 
organizations are also structurally flatter in the sense that decision rights, information, 
and organizational knowledge are distributed. Alberts and Hayes modeled edge 
organizations as networks. Considering this network topology, the phrase “pushed out” 
would be appropriate to describe authority; hence the title, Power to the Edge, because 
the organization’s knowledge and control—its power—is pushed out to its edges (Alberts 
& Hayes, 2003, pp. 206, 216–217). 
The networked design of edge organizations fosters greater interaction between 
and among all of its members. This enhanced interaction arguably moves information 
through the organization with greater speed, accuracy, and efficiency than a traditional 
mechanistic hierarchy. Alberts and Hayes argue that these qualities make edge 
organizations more agile than mechanistic hierarchies. Therefore, they reason that edge 
organizations are a good fit for the uncertain, dynamic, and emergent environments 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2003, pp. 206, 216–217). Edge organizations synthesize elements of 
many archetypes, yet they form a distinct design (Alberts & Nissen, 2009). Edge 
organizations can be characterized as meritocracies that exhibit emergent leadership 
(Alberts & Nissen, 2009).  
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E. ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS: WHAT MATTERS IN 
COMPLEX DOMAINS? 
Alberts and Hayes (2003) cited the need for agility as an imperative for 
Information Age organizations. They argue that agility may be the defining characteristic 
of effective organizations operating in the complex space (pp. 56, 123). Alberts and 
Hayes propose that agile organizations with a decentralized structure, and that promote 
innovation, are best suited to contend with unexpected events in rapidly changing 
domains (pp. 59–60). They theorize that agility is achieved through a combination of 
organizational elements that includes both structural and conceptual design. Their 
definition of agility is comprised of components including responsiveness (the capacity to 
exploit opportunities quickly), flexibility (the ability to meet objectives using various 
approaches), adaptability (the capability to change tactics to meet changing domains), 
and innovation (the capacity to utilize new techniques and resources) (pp. 141–151). This 
emphasis on agility and its constituent characteristics is echoed in the literature (Daft, 
2009, pp. 25–30; Bell & Joroff, 2001, p. 10). 
Senge (2006) took a process-oriented approach by focusing on 
“interrelationships” (pp. 42–47). In Senge’s view, systems are developed to influence 
how the organization operates. These systems form the “fabrics of interrelated actions” 
(p. 7). Systems thinking is the process of understanding these interrelationships as a 
whole (p. 68). Senge claims that some of the most complex organizational problems can 
be effectively addressed through systems thinking (p. 66). One of his examples is the war 
on terrorism, which Senge depicts as a cyclical system. All participants understand their 
role in the war from their particular perspective, but few see the whole system, even 
though every part of the system has a profound influence on the other parts. Thus, threats 
lead to action, which leads to reaction, and the cycle continues perpetually (pp. 70–71). 
Poor organizational design can cause similar blind spots, such as when the upper-level 
management is centralized and holds most of the organization’s vital information, which 
is compounded by compartmentalization that occurs within the structure to facilitate 
division of labor. Senge argues for a decentralized form, in which institutional knowledge  
 
 23
is diffuse (pp. 70–71). Hence, a parallel can be drawn to Alberts and Hayes’ notion of the 
edge organization in which organizational knowledge and information are propagated 
throughout the organization (2003, pp. 206, 216–217). 
Much of the literature suggests that agility is achieved in flatter organizational 
designs in which approval layers have been reduced and decision rights pushed down to 
the lower levels of the organization. Daft (2009) contends that in a dynamic, rapidly 
changing environment, the traditional hierarchy becomes overwhelmed. He recommends 
the concept of the learning organization (p. 31). Daft builds upon earlier work by 
Galbraith, who proposed that hierarchies become overwhelmed as uncertainty increases, 
as is the tendency in emergent and complex environments (Galbraith, 1974, p. 29). Kiel 
(1994) suggests that flat organizational structure optimizes efficiency. He characterizes 
this flattened design concept as “ideal,” and claims that, “flatter is better.” However, he 
adds that structure and business process must work interactively to maximize 
effectiveness in complex environments (pp. 155–157, 190). 
F. DESIGN OPTIONS: IT TAKES A NETWORK TO FIGHT A NETWORK 
Another organizational design theme that emerges from the literature is the use of 
networked topology to optimize multilateral communication, and thereby, promote 
organizational agility and adaptability. Networked teams demonstrate the capacity to 
work collaboratively across multiple functions to optimize agility and adaptability (Daft, 
2009, pp. 31–33). Alberts and Hayes (2003) characterize this structure as a “robustly 
networked force,” which they claim will outperform hierarchies in sense-making and 
adaptability in complex and nonlinear environments (pp. 90–93, 181–184). Lewis added, 
“networks beat hierarchies in the business world, and now we are beginning to realize 
that networks beat hierarchies in the world of politics and wars” (2007, p. 11). This claim 
was an expansion of his earlier writing where Lewis describes the removal of middle 
management to form a “dis-intermediated command hierarchy” (2006, pp. 13–14). He 




(2005) also subscribes to this belief. Lewis agrees with Daft, Alberts, and many others 
who reason that hierarchies are too slow to react and often stifle organizational 
communication. 
Tucker (2008) rejects the notion, “it takes a network to fight a network,” as some 
have suggested (p. 2). He contends that it is more important for an organization to be well 
adapted to its environment than to be concerned about its organizational structure or that 
of its enemy (p. 2). 
Leavitt (2005) cites a variety of practical and even emotional reasons that 
hierarchies will and should continue to exist as the primary organizational form. He 
added that the notion of hierarchy has changed to some degree with the introduction of 
participative management, analytic management, and “hot groups,” but that hierarchies 
are essentially “here to stay” (pp. 69–82). 
Tucker considers the relative advantages and disadvantages of both hierarchies 
and network topology. In hierarchies, information moves upward, while decisions flow 
down from the top, which develops a framework for “legitimate and accepted authority” 
linked to an individual’s rank or position in the organization. Hierarchies are rooted in a 
system of rules and regulations and ensure accountability and efficiency (Tucker, 2008, 
p. 3; Leavitt, 2005, p. 40). Some of the disadvantages of a hierarchical model include the 
possibility that critical information will move too slowly through the organization due to 
the need for approval at various layers of command and that information can also be 
filtered or distorted, which could lead to poor decisions (Tucker, 2008, pp. 3–4).  
As organizational structure flattens, the decreased levels of approval and authority 
facilitate faster and more accurate information flow with less filtering, but Tucker worries 
that faster decisions are not necessarily better (p. 4). Flatter structures and more 
distributed decision authority could lead to a loss of central control and accountability. 
Although Tucker acknowledges that networks offer an effective alternative to hierarchies 
in some settings, he argues that networks are not necessarily the right choice in all 
situations. While they can be highly adaptive and respond quickly to changes in the 
environment, networks can also be risky and unpredictable (Tucker, 2008, pp. 3–4). 
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Tucker concludes that neither organizational design is preferable in all situations 
and suggests a more flexible form that can offer positive characteristics of both. 
Sometimes the operational environment or the tasks to be performed favor networks, and 
other times they favor hierarchies (pp. 3–4). The literature generally supports a 
hypothesis that no single organizational design is optimal in all circumstances (Powley & 
Nissen, 2009, p. 3). Powley and Nissen refer to a body of prior research that recommends 
a more flexible, agile, and adaptable organizational design to address a variety of 
situations ranging from simple to complex (p. 4).  
G. CONCLUSION 
The literature supports the argument that in unstable, dynamic, and complex 
environments, organizations should be designed for agility, responsiveness, flexibility, 
adaptability, and innovation. Organizations facing complexity should be structured to 
maximize sense-making, rapid situational awareness, information sharing, and 
organizational learning. The edge organization of Alberts and Hayes or the learning 
organization of Daft and Senge offer these characteristics with their flatter design, 
reduced layers of authority, distributed decision rights, and imbedded networks for rapid 
multilateral information sharing and decision-making capacity. 
While the network topology pushes decision authority down to the operational 
level and allows for greater agility and adaptability, it is not ideal for all situations. 
Hierarchies are still optimal in routine and simple domains, which suggests that a 
flexible, hybrid organization may be well-suited for homeland security organizations that 
encounter both routine and complex challenges. Since most organizations face 
environments that include simple, complicated, complex, and at times, chaotic elements, 
the exploration of a hybrid structure that can flex between hierarchical and network 
concepts is worthy of continued research. 
Gaps in the literature exist regarding how specifically to design such a flexible 
hybrid organization. Currently, a clear idea of why organic forms perform well in 
dynamic and complex environments or how they work does not exist. 
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this research was to seek a better understanding of why and how 
organic organizational designs perform well in unstable, dynamic and complex 
environments. The case study method was selected to examine actual organizations 
operating in unstable, dynamic and complex environments, in which such an examination 
does not lend itself to repeatable experiments or easily controlled sets of variables. Also, 
“how” and “why” questions are well matched to the case study method. The use of the 
case study method facilitates the exploration of complex phenomena; in this case, the 
study of organizations, allowing for the deconstruction, reconstruction and fuller 
understanding of such phenomena (Yin, 2009; Baxter & Jack, 2008; Stake, 1995). 
A. SAMPLE DATA 
This research examined the design of four organizations, although it focused 
primarily on the two organic ones. The examination of the organizations was done within 
the context of specific operational missions and training exercises, which defined the 
cases or units of analysis. These cases were bounded within the timeframe that each 
organization conducted the specific operational mission or training exercise. This sample 
data was selected because it offered an opportunity to observe organic organizations 
operating in unstable, dynamic and complex environments and allowed for further 
deconstruction to understand better why these organizations performed well and how 
they did so. 
The sample data included published books, reports, articles, operational plans, 
after actions reviews, evaluations and past theses related to the operational missions and 
training exercises that comprised each case: 
1. Training Exercise “Operation Talavera” 
These data samples included a published book, Terrorism Early Warning: 10 
Years of Achievement in Fighting Terrorism and Crime, edited by one the co-creators of 
the Los Angeles (LA) Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), John P. Sullivan. The 
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samples also included published articles, theses, operational plans, after actions reports, 
and evaluations related to Operation Talavera, the Los Angeles Unified Command and 
the TEW. This researcher was also an observer/participant at Operation Talavera. These 
data samples provided a description of the operation, the organizational design approach 
of the unified command and the TEW, and their performance during the operation. 
2. Operation Democratic National Convention 2000 (DNC) 
These data samples included a published book, Terrorism Early Warning: 10 
Years of Achievement in Fighting Terrorism and Crime, edited by one the co-creators of 
the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), John P. Sullivan. The samples 
also included published articles, theses, operational plans, after actions reports, and 
evaluations related to Operation DNC, and the TEW. These data samples provided a 
description of the operation, the organizational design approach of the TEW, and its 
performance during the operation. 
3. Training Exercise “Operation Chimera” 
These data samples included a published book (2008), Terrorism Early Warning: 
10 Years of Achievement in Fighting Terrorism and Crime, edited by one the co-creators 
of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), John P. Sullivan. The 
samples also included published articles, theses, operational plans, after actions reports, 
and evaluations related to Operation Chimera, and the TEW. These data samples 
provided a description of the operation, the organizational design approach of the TEW, 
and its performance during the operation. 
4. Training Exercise Stryker Brigade Combat Team (CERTEX) 
These data samples included a book published by Rand Corporation (2005), 
Network Centric Operations Case Study: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The 
samples also included published articles related to the CERTEX Operation and the 
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). These data samples provided a description of the 
operation, the organizational design approach of the SBCT, and its performance during 
the operation. 
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5. Stability Operations in Northern Iraq 
These data samples included a book published by Rand Corporation (2007), 
Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker 
Brigades in Northern Iraq. The samples also included published articles related to the 
Stability Operation in Northern Iraq and the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (3/2 and 
1/25) (SBCT), and the 101st Airborne Division (101st ABD). These data samples 
provided a description of the operations, the organizational design approach of the 
SBCTs and 101st ABD, and its performance during the operations. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Most of the data was available online and collected from the worldwide web, or 
was already in the author’s possession and under his control prior to this research. The 
secondary case studies related to the Stryker brigade combat teams were purchased from 
the Rand Corporation. 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
In this multiple case study, several cases were examined to understand the 
similarities and differences between the organizations within each case. This examination 
led to the identification of phenomena that expanded the understanding of why and how 
certain forms fit particular environments. 
The proposition that organic organizational designs perform well in unstable, 
dynamic and complex environments was a fundamental theme in the literature. The data 
were analyzed with this proposition as a starting assumption. The literature also provided 
a collection of key organizational characteristics that contributed to an organization’s 
performance in unstable, dynamic and complex environments, but also related to its 
organic design, which included agility, responsiveness, flexibility, adaptability and 
innovation (Mintzberg, 1979; Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). The 
organizations in each case study were evaluated for their manifestation of these 
characteristics during the timeframe of the case. The organizations were also evaluated 
using questions gleaned from the literature to establish and validate their effectiveness in 
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the particular environments presented during the case studies, which was the standard 
used to determine effectiveness or effective performance. The organizational 
characteristics were then distilled down to basic elements that contributed to an 
organization’s performance in unstable, dynamic and complex environments, but also 
related to its organic design that included centralization, specialization, formalization, the 
use of liaisons, planning and control systems, and the support for emergent leadership 
(Mintzberg, 1979; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). The organizations in each case study were 
evaluated for the presence of these elements during the timeframe of the case. The 
elements were then applied to the Alberts and Nissen (2009) Rosetta Stone Model to 
relate them to the three thematic variables, allocation of decision rights, patterns of 
interaction and distribution of information. The organizations were depicted in a three-
dimensional space to determine their relative orientation.  
The analysis was then applied to the demands and challenges presented by 
dynamic and complex environments. These demands and challenges were evident in the 
literature and reasonably obvious in each of the case studies. This process provided 
insights into the question of why and how organic forms perform well in dynamic and 
complex environments. Most of the information was organized into a series of tables or 
matrices to facilitate its assembly, organization, and distillation. 
D. THEORETICAL SENSITIVITY: ADDRESSING BIAS 
Since researchers nearly always enter into the research environment with some 
level of bias and various levels of sensitivity, that issue must be acknowledged in this 
research. This sensitivity is shaped by the researcher’s personal and professional 
experience, which adds depth to their knowledge in the area of study and allows for the 
development theories “grounded, conceptually dense, and well integrated,” but can also 
bias their analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This researcher is an experienced homeland 
security, law enforcement and public safety professional with 27 years of training and 
actual field experience. He was also a participant-observer during Operation Talavera and 
a designated Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) associated with the TEW. He was also 
personally familiar with Operation Chimera and the DNC, and was personally acquainted 
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with many of the participants of those operations. Based on personal and professional 
relationships with members of the TEW over the course of many years, the researcher 
was party to many incidental conversations regarding the details of the case study 
operations prior to this research, and therefore, had personal knowledge as to much of the 
data. While this fact added depth and richness to the analysis, it required vigilance for 
bias and a healthy dose of skepticism to mitigate that bias, which allowed him to validate 
the literature and other data for its credibility (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2006). 
A consistent strategy of triangulating among the literature, case study data, and 
personal experience went a long way towards the identification and understanding of 
biases introduced into the study and in seeking to mitigate the influence of those biases in 
the analysis phase of the study. As themes emerged from the case study analysis, they 
were validated through correlation with professional knowledge and experience, along 
with established concepts in the foundational literature. Further validation was achieved 
by mapping analysis back to the research questions and the demands of the environment. 
Unstable, dynamic and complex environments are rapidly changing, adaptive and replete 
with uncertainty. These environments demand a capacity to collect and disseminate 
information rapidly and accurately, while making quick sense of that information to 
achieve shared situational awareness. Ultimately, these environments also demand the 
rapid and efficient conversion of information into action, achieved through sound 
decision making often based on ambiguous information. Correlated themes derived from 
the analysis, literature and professional experience had to constantly be assessed against 
these environmental demands to guard against biasing the findings. This systematic 
process kept the research credible, academically rigorous, and relatively free of bias 
induced assumptions and conclusions. 
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IV.  CASE STUDIES: WHERE CONCEPT AND REALITY INTERSECT 
The following case studies were examined to better understand how contingency 
theory; the well-established concept in the literature on organizational “fit” (Burns & 
Stalker, 2001; Woodward, 1981; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) explains the use of 
alternative designs under attenuating circumstances. One finding well supported in the 
contingency theory literature is that organic organizational forms perform well in 
unstable—dynamic—and complex environments, while mechanistic designs are effective 
in stable and simple domains (Burns & Stalker, 2001, pp. 119–125; Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967, p. 188; Galbraith, 1973, p. 2; Galbraith, 1977, pp. 28–29; Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 
270–277). The case studies in this research illustrated how well the involved 
organizations performed in each scenario, whether they were structured to be organic, 
and what steps (if any) they took to achieve fit. The environments encountered in each 
case were presumed to be unstable and complex since a high degree of uncertainty, 
ambiguity and non-linearity existed, and the environments were certainly dynamic—with 
conditions changing quickly and often. 
In some cases, only one organization—identified as organic in design—was 
examined to investigate key actions taken, processes implemented or elements 
incorporated that made the organization both effective and organic, but also to elicit how 
this contributed to its effectiveness. In other cases presented here, organic organizations 
were compared to more mechanistic ones that participated in the same operation or 
exercise. Although the research is presented with a basic presumption based on the 
literature that organic organizations perform effectively in unstable and complex 
environments, while mechanistic organizations do not, the comparisons added to the 
exploration of specific elements that either enhanced or degraded performance in such 
environments. Ultimately, these case studies were aimed at answering both the “why” 
and “how” questions. Why do organic forms perform better in unstable and complex 




and complex environments? To attempt to answer these questions, this research first had 
to address how these particular organizations achieved a more organic design, and 
thereby improved their performance. 
The case studies used for this research comprised five operations, which included 
three training exercises (Talavera, Chimera and CERTEX) and two real life operations 
(DNC and Northern Iraq). Three of the cases (DNC, Talavera and Chimera) involved 
domestic intelligence and public safety response organizations performing various 
aspects of the homeland security mission. Two of the cases (CERTEX and Northern Iraq) 
involved elements of the U.S. military in a training exercise and a combat mission that 
pitted them against terrorist and insurgent groups. Operations Talavera and Northern Iraq 
included direct comparisons of organic organizations to mechanistic organizations in the 
same unstable and complex environment. 
A. ORGANIZATIONS EXAMINED IN THE CASE STUDIES 
The case studies were conducted to examine organizational performance in 
unstable and complex environments, and each case did present dynamic and complex 
environmental elements. The particular organizations selected for investigation were 
chosen based on their organizational design and how that design influenced performance 
during each scenario. The following organizations were investigated. 
 Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) 
 Operations Section of the Los Angeles County Operational Area Unified 
Command for Operation Talavera (Operations) 
 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, U.S. Army (SBCT) 
 101st Airborne Division, U.S. Army (101st ABD) 
1. Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) 
The TEW has been described as a “multi-lateral, multi-jurisdictional, multi-
disciplinary intelligence network” comprised of functional teams or “cells” and a cadre of 
Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) that represent and report back to their respective 
agencies (Sullivan, 2000; Sullivan, 2005; Sullivan & Bauer, 2008; Miller, 2005;  
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Grossman, 2005). The organization of TEW was constructed from a wide spectrum of 
public safety, intelligence, governmental and non-governmental personnel contributed by 
their respective agencies.  
Structurally, the TEW was organized into six functional teams called “cells,” 
which consisted of the (1) officer-in-charge or OIC Cell (OIC), (2) analysis/synthesis cell 
(A/S), (3) consequence management cell (C/M), (4) investigative liaison cell (I/L), (5) 
epidemiological intelligence cell (Epi-Intel) and (6) forensic support cell (F/S), which 
included technical resources in support of the other cells (Sullivan & Bauer, 2008, pp. 
29–31). The cells were visually depicted on the TEW organizational chart as a network, 
and the organization has been consistently characterized as “networked” (Sullivan & 
Bauer, 2008; Rust, 2006; France, 2006). Based on their concept of operation (Sullivan & 
Bauer, 2008, pp. 61–93), the TEW model encouraged decentralized decision-making, 
peer-to-peer interaction, emergent leadership, reliance on liaison devices, broad 
distribution of information, and other characteristics indicative of organic design. The 
examination of the TEW in the context of the cases presumed an organizational 
orientation toward the organic end of the continuum. 
Lastly, the TEW defined its organizational roles and responsibilities based on the 
nature of the threats encountered in each situation and the organization presumed that it 




Figure 1.   The TEW Organizational (Cell) Structure (From: Sullivan & Bauer, 2008) 
2. Los Angeles Operational Area Unified Command (Operations) 
The first responder agencies from the Los Angeles County Operational area came 
together in December 2004 to participate in a training exercise called, “Operation 
Talavera” (Gardner, 2005). The organization created for the exercise was based on a 
concept known as unified command within the framework of incident command systems. 
This design is a hierarchical structure that establishes layers of command and reporting 
relationships under an incident commander and four functional sections: (1) operations, 
(2) planning, (3) logistics, and (4) finance. In unified command, the control of each 
section is collaboratively maintained by the primary agencies participating in the 
operation. In the case of Operation Talavera, the operations section was under the joint 
command of two section chiefs, a police lieutenant and an assistant fire chief. The 
operations section (operations) of the unified command structure for Operation Talavera 
was the focus of investigation for this research. 
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The operations section was organized into discipline “branches” and functional 
“groups” under the command of group leaders (usually police lieutenants and sergeants 
or fire department battalion chiefs). One example of a functional group was the crowd 
control group, which consisted of police officers from the Area G South Bay Mobile 
Field Force Platoon. Their tasks included maintaining order and discouraging acts of civil 
unrest during the mass decontamination process. Their group leader reported through the 
branch command to the operations section chiefs. Requests for resources, situation 
updates, tasking and all other related communication to and from the crowd control group 
had to be routed to the operations section chiefs, as was the case for all of the groups 
organized under the operations section. Groups could not send requests for resources 
directly to the logistics section, but had to follow the chain-of-command. 
The organizational design included centralized decision authority, constrained 
interaction between groups of the various command elements, concentrated information 
flow, high degree of functional specialization, knowledge dissemination consistent with 
what each individual required to perform their tasks, and the limited use of liaison 
devices. Based on the visual depiction of the organizational structure and its processes at 
Operation Talavera, the operations section in this context was presumed to have an 
organizational orientation toward the mechanistic end of the continuum. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Incident Command Systems Organizational Structure (From: U.S. 




Figure 3.   Operations Section Organizational Structure/Based on ICS (From: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2004) 
3. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams-U.S. Army (SBCT) 
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is one of the U.S. Army’s newest 
organizational units. The SBCT was created out of a need by the Army to possess a 
flexible and rapidly deployable force in dynamic environments, but also to sustain 
operations for longer duration. Traditionally, the Army utilized primarily either highly 
sustainable heavy forces, slow to react and difficult to deploy, or light units, which 
deploy rapidly, but were not well designed for sustained missions (Vick et al., 2002; 
Gonzales et al., 2005; Association of the United States Army, 2006). The SBCT was the 
Army’s proposed solution to both problems. The SBCT is a medium brigade-sized force 
equipped with a wheeled, fast moving, armored vehicle that can move personnel over 
great distances in a short period of time. The brigade was built for rapid deployment and 
has been mostly brought into theaters of operation on C-5 and C-17 aircraft (Vick et al., 
2002; Gordon & Orletsky, 2003). SBCTs can reportedly be anywhere in the world in 96 
hours, compared to a division at approximately 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. 
They possess the lethality and mobility of a light unit, but with the sustainability and 
survivability of heavy forces (Vick et al., 2002; Gonzales et al., 2005; Gonzalez et al., 
2007). Some in the Army leadership have envisioned an entire future force designed 
around this model (Vick et al., 2002). 
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The SBCT is a multi-dimensional combined-arms unit with approximately 3,500–
5,000 soldiers total. The literature on the SBCT describes it as, “organic,” but the term in 
the Army context is not meant the same as it has been used in the OMT literature or in 
this research. By “organic,” the SBCT reports refer to the array of embedded support 
functions that allow it to conduct a variety of operations (Vick et al., 2002; Gonzales et 
al., 2005; Gonzalez et al., 2007). These support functions in traditional army units are 
called in from the division level as part of the Army’s reach back component. Requests 
for support and expertise can slow deployment and reaction time for most units, which is 
not so with the SBCT, who generally have such capabilities built into their organizational 
design. One example of this capability is the presence of an “organic” Reconnaissance-
Surveillance-and-Target-Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron. The SBCT also has three 
infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion, one brigade-support battalion, one 
antitank company, one engineer company, one signal company and an embedded 
intelligence company, so they are capable of collecting, analyzing and disseminating a 
variety of human, signals and other intelligence. The RSTA squadron and intelligence 
components are greatly assisted by the availability of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 
which are an integral part of the SBCT. Human intelligence–trained personnel 
accompany the reconnaissance function to assist with gathering intelligence from 
civilians in stability and support operations. These combined reconnaissance and 
intelligence capabilities are critical in complex environments in which close tactical 
combat is unfolding and adversaries include terrorists and insurgents who conceal 
themselves among the local population. The latter is one of many examples where the 
SBCT’s embedded units, cross-trained personnel, and mixed mission capability make it a 
virtually self-contained unit, which is atypical of Army units at the brigade level and the 
reason they can sustain over a longer time duration. The SBCT differ from the traditional 
Light Infantry Brigade with additional personnel, more diverse capabilities and advance 
communications technology (Gonzales et al., 2005; Gonzalez et al., 2007; Association of 
the United States Army, 2006). 
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The digital network communications capabilities are central to the SBCT’s design 
and give the unit a distinct advantage over comparable units when operating in dynamic 
environments. The Stryker brigade’s innovative organizational structure, digital 
communications network and “organic” support units are part of new conceptual 
framework called, “Network-Centric Operations” (NCO). The Army developed this 
conceptual framework and accompanying doctrine, incorporated as a part of the SBCT 
ideology, which has changed the way the Army fights in some combat environments. The 
use of the SBCT in NCO offers the ability to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, 
and stability and support operations with the SBCT in greatly expanded geographical area 
of operations. The literature calls this “Full Spectrum Operations” (Gonzales et al., 2005; 
Nardulli, 2003, p. 48; Association of the United States Army, 2006, pp. 4–8). 
The SBCT’s flexible design and concept of operation allow it to be organized 
structurally as a hierarchy, but in unstable, dynamic and complex environments, it 
operates more organically. Depending on the environment, field commanders may choose 
to follow predesigned and detailed orders based on centralized execution in accord with a 
specific concept, or in the alternative, may elect to utilize orders that support a 
decentralized execution in accord with the commander’s intent. This more decentralized 
approach provides a clear description of command intent and mission objectives, but with 
less detailed descriptions of the methods to achieve those objectives, and thus, can be 
prepared more quickly. Decentralization supports the SBCT motto of “See First, 
Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively.” SBCT doctrine provides multiple 
options for command methodology and unit synchronization (Gonzales et al., 2005). This 
flexibility provides a great deal of operational agility, and theoretically, increases 




Figure 4.   Network-Centric Operations Concept/Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
Organizational Doctrine (From: Rand Corporation, 2005) 
During both case studies involving the SBCT—Certification Exercise (CERTEX) 
and the stability operations in Northern Iraq—the brigade is presumed to be operating in 
a model closer to organic than mechanistic on the continuum. These organic aspects of 













Figure 5.   Stryker Brigade Combat Team Lines of Development (From: Rand 
Corporation, 2005) 
 
Figure 6.   Stryker Brigade Combat Team Organizational Table (From: Wikipedia, 
2008) 
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4. 101st Airborne Division-U.S. Army (101st) 
The 101st Airborne Division (101st ABD) of the U.S. Army is organized as a 
hierarchy with a distinct chain-of-command and comprised of approximately 17,000 
soldiers. The 101st ABD includes three infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, two 
aviation brigades (one assault and one support), a sustainment brigade, an air defense 
battery, a battalion and a company of military police, and an engineering battalion. 
During the stability operations in Northern Iraq, the 101st ABD had more than 100 UH-
60 Black Hawk helicopters available, whereas the SBCT had only ten. The 101st ABD 
has more than three times the number of personnel assigned than the SBCT. Based on 
their size and the number of embedded support personnel typical of division level heavy 
forces, the 101st ABD are ideally organized for stability operations in a large geographic 
region like Northern Iraq. The 101st ABD makes a better comparison unit for the SBCT 
than a light infantry brigade in spite of the apparent size mismatch (Gonzalez et al., 
2007).  
Based on the visual depiction of the organizational structure and its processes 
during the stability operations in Northern Iraq, the 101st ABD was presumed to have an 
organizational orientation toward the mechanistic end of the continuum. 
 
Figure 7.   The 101st Airborne Division Organizational Structure (From: 
http://www.militaryphotos.net, 2008) 
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B. CASE STUDIES-THE SCENARIOS 
1. Operation Talavera-Training Exercise—2004 
In 2004, the Los Angeles County Operational Area conducted a training 
exercise—“Operation Talavera”—that included that participation of federal, state, county 
and municipal response agencies, and the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group 
(TEW), with its network of Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO). The exercise involved the 
theft of radioactive materials and a series of suspicious activities by terrorist groups 
throughout the summer, culminating in the December explosion at the Great Western 
Forum sports venue in Inglewood, California. 
During the first phase of the exercise—the pre-incident prevention—the TEW 
collected, analyzed and disseminated intelligence related to the theft of radioactive 
materials and indications of a potential terrorist attack. During the second phase of the 
exercise—the incident—the response agencies managed the complexities of the 
explosion and its aftermath. The TEW provided intelligence support for the response. The 
first responders were organized into a unified command within the framework of incident 
command systems, which included an operations section under the joint command of two 
section chiefs, a police lieutenant and an assistant fire chief, which was a hierarchical 
design with a distinct chain-of-command. The second phase—the incident—of Operation 
Talavera was a full-scale exercise; in other words, it was as close to the real thing as 
possible. The exercise included real explosions, debris and similar special effects at the 
actual site—Great Western Forum in Inglewood. Approximately 150 role players 
(simulated victims) exhibited a variety of injuries and were subjected to actual 
decontamination procedures. Responder personnel were on-site, dressed in realistic attire 
and performing the actual duties they would be in a real event. The exercise was 
conducted mostly in real time, although some time compression occurred as the scenario 
unfolded throughout the day. 
This case study was important for two reasons. First, it offered an opportunity to 
observe how an organic organization—the TEW—performed in an unstable, dynamic 
and complex environment; and second, it provided a comparison of organizational 
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performance between an organic—TEW—and a mechanistic organization—the 
operations section. The case was examined to determine if the TEW was effective and 
how their organic design contributed to that effectiveness. Basic assumptions established 
from a synthesis of the literature supported a prediction that the TEW would outperform 
the operations section in this unstable and complex environment. This research examined 
why the organic organization outperformed the mechanistic one, and what design 
elements of each contributed to or degraded organizational effectiveness. In other words, 
how did the TEW maximize its effectiveness and how did the Operations Section 
handicap theirs? 
The scenario started with the TEW collecting and analyzing open source 
intelligence and classified reports indicating increased activity by the terrorist group 
called Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). This South Asian group traditionally focused on the 
Kashmir region of India and Pakistan, but the TEW sources suggested that LeT was 
directing its attention to the presence of the U.S. military in Afghanistan, which was 
putting pressure on the Taliban and al-Qaeda. LeT was particularly distressed by the 
erosion of one of its primary funding sources—the revenues derived from the opium 
poppy fields in Afghanistan. 
LeT had attempted to organize a meeting with representatives from al-Qaeda, 
HAMAS and Hezbollah, in an effort to create a collaborative terror network to attack the 
continental United States. The LeT leader, Mohammed Latif, was attempting to leverage 
his connection with an Islamic scientist in India’s nuclear program. It was suspected that 
the goal was to construct a Radiological Dispersal Devise (RDD)—a traditional explosive 
laden with radioactive material that disperses into the atmosphere during the kinetic 
energy release of the explosion. 
The TEW monitored a report from the San Diego Police Department regarding 
the theft of a “blood irradiator” from a local hospital. Hospital officials confirmed the 
theft of the equipment from a wing of the hospital undergoing renovation. This device 
contained radioactive material—5,000 curies of Cesium-137. The FBI joined the 
investigation and began a sweep of the city, using a joint task force of local, state and 
federal agencies. 
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The FBI conducted a raid on an industrial warehouse in Irvine, California. They 
seized a collection of bomb making material. During the search of the warehouse, 
dismantled parts of a blood irradiator were found. Two individuals using false 
identification had rented the warehouse one week before the FBI raid. Witnesses saw a 
large van leaving the warehouse the day prior to the raid. At this stage of the intelligence 
analysis, TEW members estimated that the construction of a radiological dispersal device 
(RDD) had been completed. 
Throughout the pre-incident phase of the exercise, the TEW made constant use of 
the TLOs to collect information from other agencies and to disseminate intelligence back 
to those agencies. TEW used liaisons from the FBI and other federal agencies in the 
exercise to ensure that information flowed quickly and efficiently. The decentralized 
design of TEW reduced the possibility of information bottlenecks, which resulted in the 
group’s rapid acquisition of situational awareness. The after action report said, “during 
the exercise, the TEW and its members performed exceptionally well. Within a short 
period of time, the TEW was able to establish a threat picture based on less than obvious 
indications of a developing threat.” The use of liaison devices (Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 161–
162) was a central feature of the TEW design during the exercise. This use of liaisons 
enhanced the distribution of information among TEW members and to the other agencies 
in the exercise, particularly the FBI. The use of the TLO network was one of the primary 
components of the distribution of information. 
The second stage of the scenario involved the detonation of a RDD at the Great 
Western Forum sports arena in Inglewood, California. The target of the attack was an 
event organized to honor military personnel who had served in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
which was attended by several thousand people. The resulting explosion caused 
significant structural damage to the facility, killed and injured hundreds of attendees, and 
dispersed a plume of radiation into the atmosphere. This led to a panicked evacuation of 
the venue and a host of complex and dynamic challenges for first responders. The first 
recognition of the radiation threat occurred when responding firefighters began to notice 
their dosimeters sounding alarms. 
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The responder agencies organized a command post near the site and established a 
unified command. The primary agencies were police, fire and emergency medical 
personnel. The objectives were to stabilize the site, restrict access to and from the blast 
zone, decontaminate and treat survivors for any injuries, evacuate the site and forecast 
where the radioactive plume would move. 
In addition to the challenges of mass care and shelter for the injured and 
evacuated survivors, and the threat of radiation to the surrounding community, one of the 
primary challenges was to deal with the level of panic among the survivors. Many of 
them wanted to leave the site, but responders could not allow them to leave prior to 
decontamination. The crowd control group consisting of members of the Area G South 
Bay Mobile Field Force Platoon was assigned to the mass decontamination zone to keep 
order and move people through the decontamination stations. They were organized into 
squads under the command of a lieutenant and squad leaders (sergeants). These personnel 
were operating in class C personal protective equipment (PPE), including Tyvek suits 
over their uniforms and respirator masks. They were also wearing riot helmets and 
carrying riot shields. The conditions were difficult because the personnel were hot and 
had difficulty breathing while wearing the masks. The physical demands of crowd 
control, and the difficulties imposed by the PPE and riot attire caused personnel to fatigue 
very quickly. These conditions required frequent and continuous rotation of personnel, 
and on-scene personnel could not leave their posts until relieved by incoming fresh 
replacements. Due to the hierarchical design of the organization and the chain-of-
command, requests for rotation had to be communicated from the squad leaders to the 
group leader, through the branch commanders, and passed onto the operations section 
chief, who in turn, alerted the staging manager to send the necessary resources. The 
group leaders were not given the decision authority to issue such an order and the 
interaction between unified command elements had to go through the centralized 
leadership structure (section chiefs). The disadvantage of this design became apparent 
when the section chiefs became overwhelmed with requests and information, and a 
significant delay occurred in replacements being sent to the site. A similar breakdown in 
communication occurred when one group failed to alert another of structural concerns in 
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the facility. Since the information had to go through the chain-of-command, the rescue 
teams were not given the information in a timely manner, which resulted in the loss of 
responder personnel in a partial collapse of the structure. 
The inability of individual units to interact with each other and the requirement of 
passing information through a central command caused information lag, and in some 
cases, distortion of information. The restricted decision authority among field 
commanders degraded their ability to make sensible decisions in the face of changing 
conditions without seeking approval from the command post. In the context of the 
unstable, dynamic and complex environment during the exercise, the organizational 
design of the operations section degraded it ability to meet its objectives.  
The TEW was tasked with support of the response efforts, including frequent 
updates to contribute to situational awareness and estimates for how the scenario would 
unfold (net assessment). They effectively provided timely and actionable intelligence to 
all responder agencies. Their primary tool at the command post was the use of the TLOs 
to communicate new information. They did not operate with any information sharing 
restrictions. Each of the TEW cells was allowed to communicate directly with any other 
cell. The A/S cell collated and analyzed incoming information to ensure nothing was 
missed and the OIC cell ensured that the cells were coordinating with each other. This 
coordination became critical when one of the TLOs became aware of a crowd control 
problem at a local hospital where contaminated survivors of the explosion had walked 
into the emergency room. The TEW network quickly alerted the responder agencies and a 
group was tasked with security and decontamination in the hospital parking lot. 
Numerous examples occurred throughout the exercise of TEW or TLO personnel 
relaying critical information to responder agencies so that information could be quickly 
converted into action. The decentralized design, unrestricted communication and the use 
of liaisons contributed to the TEW effectiveness and ensured their exercise objectives 
were achieved.  
The after action report read, “the exercise emphasized all-source intelligence 
collection and fusion in support of multiple allied law enforcement agencies working 
informants, tips and leads. Additionally, because the TEW is uniquely 
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structured…information was also collected through non-law enforcement channels, 
adding to the depth and robustness of the analysis. The “structure” was a network, in 
which the patterns of interaction were unconstrained and the distribution of information 




Figure 8.   Operation Talavera Images (From: IAFC On Scene, 2005) 
Figure 9.   Operation Talavera Images (From: http://uuu.mindtel.com, 2011) 
2. Operation Chimera-Training Exercise—2005 
In August 2005, the Los Angeles County Operational Area conducted a training 
exercise —“Operation Chimera” that included that participation of federal, state county 
and municipal response agencies, which included the Los Angeles Terrorism Early 
Warning Group (TEW) and its network of Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO). The 
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exercise involved a biological (anthrax) attack by a terrorist group (al-Qaeda), a narrative 
that in theory was designed to unfold over a period of months as people began to report 
flu-like illness, but eventually would be linked to anthrax exposure. The concurrent 
counterterrorism investigations by other agencies over time intersected with the reported 
infections, but the complete picture of what was happening was unclear to TEW members 
attempting to uncover and connect information sources to acquire situational awareness. 
This situation was the intended reality the exercise was designed to replicate, but the 
participants were actually gathered together during a single day to conduct the exercise. 
The compressed time scale, during which hours could represent days or weeks, presented 
some artificiality, but the sequence of events and desired responses were designed to be 
as realistic as possible. 
This case study provided further opportunity to observe how an organic 
organization—the TEW—performed in an unstable, dynamic and complex environment. 
The case was examined to determine if the TEW was effective, and why and how their 
organic design contributed to that effectiveness.  
The scenario involved the aerosolized release of anthrax (Bacillus Anthracis) in 
the greater metropolitan area of Los Angeles, California, which was ultimately 
established to be a terrorist attack. Various parts of the scenario were given to TEW 
members at different times during the exercise. 
In the early stages of the scenario, it was reported that intelligence summaries had 
documented communications between Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The 
substance of the communications was unknown, but the messages between the two 
terrorist leaders had increased in number and frequency. It was suspected that bin Laden 
wanted Zarqawi to focus his attack planning outside of Iraq and possibly within the 
United States, which was seen a significant shift in strategy. 
At approximately the same time that intelligence officials were becoming 
concerned about the trend in al-Qaeda communications, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) began to notice an increase in reports of the flu in the Los Angeles 
County operational area, which had risen to exceed the annual national average. The 
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Public Health Officer for Los Angeles County requested that all LA area hospitals and 
clinics report any patients complaining of flu-like symptoms through the county’s 
computerized reporting system (REDDINET). The health department was seeking to 
understand better the reasons for the statistical anomaly in their region. 
Within this timeframe, the FBI issued an alert to law enforcement agencies that it 
was investigating a connection between the Mara Salvatrucha gang (MS-13) and radical 
“Arab” or “Muslim” groups seeking to use established narcotics smuggling routes. 
The New Orleans Health Department reported that three longshoremen had 
contact with a sheep contaminated with anthrax spores and all three were eventually 
admitted to a local hospital with flu-like symptoms, where one of the men ultimately 
died. Anthrax exposure was listed as the cause of death. As the New Orleans incident 
came to light, laboratory results in Los Angeles confirmed several cases of the “flu” 
actually tested positive for Bacillus Anthracis, the bacteria commonly known as anthrax. 
As FBI investigators discovered the possible source of the anthrax, which was a 
tampered shipping container in the Port of New Orleans that contained Russian made, 
weaponized anthrax, al-Qaeda terrorist and American citizen Adam Gadahan (aka Azzam 
the American) was taken into custody in San Diego, but immediately died from anthrax 
exposure. As the anthrax threat became clearer, a safe house in London was raided and 
evidence was seized that revealed a possible plot against U.S. rail transportation. 
The TEW had to work collaboratively with public health officials both at the 
federal and local level to monitor the number and location of cases. The objectives were 
to detect the existence and extent of the attack, develop situational awareness, forecast 
how the attack would unfold and develop strategic counter-measures. 
As the scenario unfolded, the TEW collected and disseminated information with 
liaisons at the health department and among the public safety agencies they represent. 
Members of the TEW’s epidemiological team (epi-intel cell) collected enough 
information from public health officials to suspect a biological attack, which was done 
rapidly through their “syndromic surveillance capabilities.” Once the illnesses were  
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suspected to be an attack, the TEW made a several design changes that are indicative of 
the TEW philosophy, but atypical of traditional response organizations—where the 
design is generally oriented more towards the mechanistic end of the continuum.  
First, the epi-intel cell lead, who was a bioterrorism expert, embedded as a direct 
liaison to the Public Health Technical Advisory Group (TAG), which was a cross-section 
of federal officials organized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This 
allowed information to move horizontally across agency lines. At the same time, the 
TLOs were already disseminating information horizontally to their respective agencies. 
This use of liaison devices optimized the speed and accuracy of necessary information. 
The use of liaison devices positively influenced the pattern of interaction among 
organizational members and across organizational lines, but also broadened the 
distribution of information necessary to perform effectively, which related directly to the 
literature (Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 431–467; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). 
Second, the TEW fully integrated the epi-intel cell into the analysis/synthesis 
(A/S) cell, which is the TEW’s team for collating and analyzing incoming information 
from all sources. It would have been unthinkable for most responder agencies with a 
more mechanistic orientation simply to fold one organizational sub-unit into another for 
situational reasons, but the TEW philosophy allows for any of its teams (cells) to 
combine with any other cell. This flexibility of form can be related to the literature as a 
key strength of organic organizations (Galbraith, 1973; Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Alberts & 
Nissen, 2009). 
Third, the epi-intel cell took the lead role in the exercise since it was determined 
to be an epidemiological threat it was confronting. The epi-intel cell would set the tempo 
and direct resources throughout the remainder of the exercise. Since the epi-intel cell is 
not normally the lead cell, this change of form demonstrated emergent leadership, which 
is another characteristic of organic designs described in the literature (Alerts & Hayes, 
2003; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). 
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This flexibility of form, use of liaison devices and emergent leadership 
contributed to the unconstrained pattern of member interaction, decentralized decision 
authority, and broad distribution of information; and therefore, to the overall 
effectiveness of the TEW, who achieved the exercise objectives. 
3. Democratic National Convention—August 2000 
Between August 14 and August 17, 2000, the City of Los Angeles hosted the 
Democratic National Convention (DNC) at the Staple Center in downtown, immediately 
after the City of Long Beach, CA had finished hosting the Reform Party Convention 
August 10–13 at the Long Beach Convention Center. These major political events 
presented public safety and security challenges in the Los Angeles region that required a 
massive intelligence effort. The larger of the two events (DNC) was designated a 
National Security Special Event (NSSE), which is an event identified by the Department 
of Homeland Security to be of such a significance that it could be a likely target for a 
terrorist attack. The NSSE status is based on the anticipated attendance of dignitaries, the 
size of the event, and the political or cultural significance of the event. Part of the large 
response for both events included the activation of the Los Angeles County Operational 
Area Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department Operations Center (DOC), both of which were responsible for coordination 
of county resources. The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) and its 
TLO network were assigned to provide intelligence support to the CEOC and the DOC, 
which included pre-event planning, trans-event response and assessment, and post-event 
recovery. 
Although other intelligence organizations were part of the operational deployment 
for the DNC, this research examined the TEW because of its organic design. This case 
study provided an opportunity to observe how an organic organization—the TEW—
performed in an unstable, dynamic and complex environment; in this case, a real 
operation conducted in real time. The case was investigated to determine if the TEW was 
effective and how their organic design contributed to that effectiveness.  
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The DNC presented serious security concerns including the possibility of terrorist 
attacks and the near certainty of civil protest groups. The TEW’s primary concern was 
the possibility that interest groups representing causes ranging from human rights, labor, 
globalization and trade to animal rights, environmental rights, abortion rights and anti-
police would stage protests or conduct civil disobedience operations. In particular, the 
anarchists had made public pronouncements that they would engage in what they called 
“direct action” operations, where violent and unlawful activities aimed at disruption of 
the event would be conducted. Groups known as “black blocs” were of great concern. 
The TEW had collected intelligence from prior events in other cities at which “black 
blocs” had used such tactics, including the Washington D.C. World Bank meetings and 
the Seattle World Trade Organization event, during which rioting had resulted. The TEW 
was tasked with maintaining situational awareness, collection and dissemination of 
intelligence, and conducting a net assessment to forecast upcoming issues to develop 
countermeasures where possible. 
Early in the operation, the TEW made use of liaisons by embedding members of 
their teams into other operational units among responder agencies and inviting 
corresponding members of those units into the TEW structure, which included the FBI 
and Los Angeles Police Department. These liaisons were in addition to the cadre of TLOs 
that represent the individual agencies that contribute to the TEW. This liaison concept 
had immediate results. On August 14, reports began to surface that protest groups were 
becoming cohesive and were “practicing” the use of mass movement for effect. Several 
of the groups were seen rehearsing these pre-designed movements. They were also 
employing the use of radio scanners to monitor police frequencies, and thereby, anticipate 
and evade enforcement action. The functional TEW team in charge of analysis and 
synthesis (A/S cell) began to analyze such reports quickly with an emphasis on predicting 
future movements by the groups, followed by rapid dissemination to field units. One 
early incident occurred when a group at Hill and 6th Streets surrounded a LAPD squad. 
This incident and others were analyzed to discern and disseminate tactics. Other field 
units were quickly alerted to the almost ubiquitous presence of demonstrators’ backpacks  
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that contained gas masks, lighter fluid and spray cans. This forewarning resulted in mass 
arrests of backpackers in possession of those items. The use of liaisons ensured the rapid 
and broad dissemination of these critical details. 
The rapid collection, analysis and dissemination of such intelligence armed field 
units with information related to tactics like linking arms, the use of super glue on 
fingers, and other disruptive practices. This knowledge also led to the anticipation of 
protestor movements including a planned protest at police stations and custody facilities. 
Much of this information was collected on August 15 and disseminated in time to 
anticipate marches at the Rampart Police Station and Parker Center on the morning of 
August 16. Liaison devices and decentralized dissemination through the TLO network 
predicted protestor tactics and movements and converted intelligence into law 
enforcement action with minimal delay. By the morning of August 17, the TEW was 
receiving reports that protestors were becoming frustrated at their lack of effective 
resistance. 
The TEW met the operational objectives using broadly distributed information 
dissemination, liaison devices and networked teams. This information dissemination 
mode is indicative of organic design and it alerted field units to necessary information 
that improved field tactics and safety for the responders. 
4. Certification Exercise-Stryker Brigade Combat Team 2003 
In May 2003, the U.S. Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) participated 
in a certification training exercise (CERTEX) at the Joint Readiness Training Center 
(JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This training exercise was set on the fictional island of 
Aragon in and around the fictional town of Shughart-Gordon. The SBCT was directed to 
meet three simultaneous mission objectives. 
1. Attack and defeat an enemy force that had time to establish defensive 
positions 
2. Defend against an enemy attack in another geographical sector from the 
offensive mission 
3. Conduct a stability and support operation to assist and protect the local 
civil authorities 
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Prior to this particular exercise at the JRTC, no light infantry or mechanized 
brigades had ever been expected to conduct this combination of complex operations 
simultaneously. The difficulty of the exercise did not favor success for the SBCT. In fact, 
it was anticipated that the best outcome for the SBCT would be mutual destruction. In the 
search for case studies that best exemplified unstable, dynamic, and complex 
environments, few could have had a better fit than CERTEX. 
This case study, taken from secondary source material by the Rand National 
Defense Research Institute, Network-Centric Operations Case Study: The Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team (Gonzales et al., 2005), was selected because it offered an 
opportunity to observe how an organization—the SBCT—functioned organically in an 
unstable, dynamic and complex environment even though its organizational structure was 
visually depicted as a hierarchy on the organizational chart. The SBCT demonstrated 
organizational flexibility that became evident in this case, and this flexibility enhanced its 
performance. The CERTEX case study provided some key indications as to why and how 
organic organizational designs perform well in unstable, dynamic and complex 
environments. 
The scenario occurred in an exercise zone 50-kilometers by 50-kilometers in total 
area. The action began with an enemy force comprised of personnel numbering at the 
tactical brigade level, traveling south and moving into position to mount an attack on 
elements of the SBCT. Simultaneously, a group of insurgent fighters about the size of 
three companies, assumed to number approximately 450 enemy combatants, formed 
defensive positions along the roads leading into the town of Shughart-Gordon. An 
additional group of enemy specialists was conducting raids in various locations in the 
operational area against “friendly forces” and a forward operating airbase. The 
complexity of the exercise was compounded by the densely forested battle terrain, with a 
mix of urban areas, and the SBCT also had to contend with the presence of innocent 
civilians, criminal elements, members of the media and non-governmental organizations 
present in the battlespace. 
The enemy forces were simultaneously defending a 15-kilometer–wide disruption 
zone east of Shughart-Gordon, attacking friendly reconnaissance elements, denying 
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avenues of approach, and inflicting personnel attrition on friendly forces. The enemy 
forces had a significant amount of time to prepare defensive positions in the urban 
terrain, using barbed wire and mines. They had also established firebases that could 
provide direct and indirect fire on forces attempting to advance on the defended positions. 
The SBCT mission was to attack, seize and control the defended enemy positions, 
while restoring the political control and stability of the town of Shughart-Gordon. The 
brigade commander’s concept of operation was based on gaining and exploiting the 
information advantage, and using that information to maintain offensive momentum.  
In the interest of transparency, it is important to highlight the three main 
advantages that the SBCT has over traditional light infantry brigades. It possesses 
advanced digital communications capabilities (pursuant to the doctrine of network-centric 
operations) including live video conferencing. It also possesses fast-moving armored 
vehicles that can deliver soldiers to the attack zones without fatiguing them by marching 
them on foot; and the SBCT uses a non-traditional organizational design that includes 
organic design principles. The Rand case study focused on the digital technology 
component as a variable for measuring effective performance, but the study conceded it 
was impossible to separate the various advantages to measure any one of them. This 
research took the Rand data to observe the organizational design features and their 
contributions to unit effectiveness, but like the Rand study, it was impossible to 
completely determine how much of the SBCT’s total performance was due to the 
technology, the use of the Stryker vehicle, or the organic design. 
Early in the attack planning, the SBCT commanders conducted a series of multi-
echelon planning meetings to synchronize the forces and unify their understanding of the 
battlefield. These planning meetings were conducted via digital video teleconferencing 
and allowed commanders to be forward with their troops, yet able to confer with their 
peers and superiors. From an organizational design framework, the planning meetings 
demonstrated organic orientation in several ways. They stressed multi-lateral, peer-to-
peer communications, which simultaneously supported unconstrained patterns of 
interaction and broadened the distribution of information. The meetings expedited the 
acquisition of shared situational awareness, or what SBCT commanders referred to as 
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“Common Operating Picture” (COP), which ultimately contributed to the self-
synchronization of the SBCT subunits. These concepts also contributed to improved 
operational performance by allowing the SBCT to move quickly and press the battle 
more aggressively. Many of these concepts related directly to the literature on organic 
organizational design (Mintzberg, 1979; Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Alberts & Nissen, 
2009). 
One of the mission objectives was to attack, seize and control the enemy’s 
defensive positions, and ultimately, seize control of Shughart-Gordon by 0600 hours on 
May 25. The battle plan called for an attack at 0400 hours, two hours ahead of the 
objective target time. One of the “organic” RSTA squadrons was given the assignment to 
conduct reconnaissance of and collect intelligence on the routes into the town. The 
intended objective of this reconnaissance/intelligence mission was to obtain information 
necessary to support a decision whether to attack the town from the north or south. The 
information was so timely and accurate in depicting enemy force location and strength 
that the entire battle plan was adapted around this changing variable. Since the SBCT 
routinely provided its commanders with the decision authority to follow the original plan 
or adapt within the mission intent to new information, the commander made two key 
decisions. He decided to maneuver his forces to bypass 66% of the enemy’s force 
strength and attack their weakest point; and he accelerated the attack schedule by 13 
hours, and launched the attack at 1500 hours on May 24. The tactical maneuver and 
accelerated timeframe caught the enemy force by surprise and proved to be the decisive 
battle of the exercise. The keys to the SBCT success included the following. 
 Decentralized decision authority allocated to subordinate commanders 
 Broad distribution of information among SBCT personnel 
 Unrestrained patterns of interaction allowing for peer-to-peer 
communication  
SBCT commanders used the updated information to change the battle plan and 
move their forces earlier and in a different direction than originally planned. This 
adaptation was made possible because of the information advantage achieved by the 
RSTA squadron through a mixture of technological data and human intelligence 
(HUMINT). The advanced digital technology utilized by the SBCT thus became an 
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inextricable element in its organizational design. The technology established links 
between the layers of command and among various subunits of the SBCT, which served 
as a liaison device to broaden both peer-to-peer interaction and distribution of 
information. Decentralized decision authority, peer-to-peer interaction, and broad 
distribution of information are key concepts in the OMT literature related to organic 
organizational forms (Mintzberg, 1979; Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). 
The literature supports the concept that information richness and accuracy are enhanced 
by peer-to-peer interaction, and the broad dissemination of information (Mintzberg, 1979; 
Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). The Rand report expressly measured 
the information quality and accuracy as variables. Baseline units typically rated the 
quality and accuracy of information received during the exercise at about 20%, based on 
post exercise interviews; that quality and accuracy rating soared to 90% among 
participants interviewed from the SBCT (Gonzales et al., 2005). The digital technology 
contributed heavily to this finding. The complexity of the environment offered 
opportunities that could be exploited by the technology, which became an element of the 
SBCT’s organizational design. 
The Rand report (2005) read, “the SBCT demonstrated improved speed of 
command, creating better decision options, self-synchronization, force agility, mission 
success, and survivability” (p. 93). Since the Army ran these exercises routinely, it had 
established some baseline performance measurements for brigade level units in the past. 
The report indicated that the SBCT performance exceeded the baseline standard in nearly 
every measureable category (pp. 61–99). Ninety-five percent of the SBCT soldiers 
interviewed by Rand had confidence in the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission (p. 
98). 
The organic design features that contributed to performance included peer-to-peer 
communication, shared situation awareness, and broad distribution of information with 
multi-echelon meetings, and improved flexibility and agility using decentralized decision 
authority. The superior performance of the SBCT exemplified their motto of, “see first, 




Figure 10.   NCO/SBCT Command and Synchronization Options (From: Rand 
Corporation, 2005) 
5. Northern Iraq-Stryker Brigade Combat Teams 2003–2005 
In the case study of the 2003 SBCT CERTEX, the Rand report (2005) 
characterized the Stryker brigade as agile, adaptive, responsive, innovative and capable of 
operating effectively and efficiently in highly uncertain and ambiguous environments. 
These characteristics and capabilities are consistently associated with the SBCT in a 
variety of literature (Association of the United States Army, 2006; Toomey, 2004; Vick 
et al., 2002), and those very same characteristics are consistently correlated with organic 
design in the OMT literature. The Rand report (2005) also pointed to the decentralized 
decision authority allocated amongst its corps of subordinate commanders, as a key to 
enhanced performance. The SBCT doctrine on leadership includes, “…developing agile, 
adaptive, and confident leaders by blending both analytical and creative ways of thinking 
and training” (Gonzales et al., 2005, p. 37). These are some of the elements that correlate 
to organic design and also contributed to the SBCT’s superior performance, but that was 
training. How would these design elements come into play in actual combat? This 
question was examined in the following case study of the stability operations in northern 
Iraq, which was documented in another report by the Rand Corporation. The case 
presented further opportunity to examine the organizational characteristics of the SBCT, 
and why and how organic designs perform well in unstable, dynamic and complex 
environments. The modern battlefield in the asymmetrical age of the “War of Terror” 
(WOT) offers an ideal environment to examine these questions. 
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Between 2003 and 2005, three units of the U.S. Army conducted stability and 
counterinsurgency operations in the provinces of northern Iraq. 
 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division (3/2 
SBCT) 
 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 25th Infantry Division (1/25 
SBCT) 
 101st Airborne Division (101st ABD) 
The stability and counterinsurgency operations examined for this case study had 
two primary mission objectives. 
1. Stabilize the political environment to support Iraqi national democratic 
governance 
2. Defeat terrorist and insurgent groups in the area of operation 
This case study taken from secondary source material by the Rand National 
Defense Research Institute, Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st Airborne 
Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker Brigades in Northern Iraq (Gonzales et al., 2007) was 
selected because it offered an opportunity to observe how organizations—the 3/2 and 
1/25 SBCTs—functioned organically in an unstable, dynamic and complex environment 
as compared to a more traditionally mechanistic design—101st ABD. 
It should be disclosed that the SBCTs had some advantages over the 101st ABD 
because of their use of advanced digital communications capabilities (network-centric 
operations) including live video conferencing. They also used fast-moving and heavier 
armored vehicles that could deliver soldiers safely to the attack zones without fatiguing 
them by marching them on foot. The SBCTs also had a non-traditional organizational 
design that included concepts of organic design. The 101st ABD could only communicate 
with lower echelon field commanders through analog radio communications and had only 
lightly armored personnel carriers that were more vulnerable to attack, and therefore, 
susceptible to casualties. The advantage of digital communications gave the SBCT field 
commanders a much shorter planning cycle for attack planning and greater agility to 
redirect resources to change the attack strategy or choice of target (Gonzales et al., pp. 
69, 154). Conversely, the 101st ABD had the advantages of a force three times the size of 
either SBCT and the presence of a significant number of military police personnel who 
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assisted in supporting civilian policing efforts. This research took the Rand data and 
investigated the organizational design elements, and how they contributed to unit 
effectiveness, but it is impossible to determine how much of the total performance 
differences were due to the technology, the use of the Stryker vehicle, or the organic 
design of the SBCTs. As with the Rand study, this research remained focused on the 
Stryker brigade’s performance in stability operations. The inclusion of the 101st ABD’s 
performance was only to establish a baseline comparison. 
The area of operations included Ninawah, Dahuk, Arbil, and As-Sulaymaniyah 
provinces, which comprised a total area of nearly 64,000 square kilometers, and included 
the two largest cities in northern Iraq, Mosul and Tal Afar. The estimated total population 
for the entire operational area was six million inhabitants, but this research focused 
primarily on combat engagements in Ninawah province with a population of 2.5 million 
inhabitants. Mosul and Tal Afar are located in this area and it is the only province in 
which all three units (101st ABD, 3/2 SBCT, and 1/25 SBCT) consistently operated, 
although at different times. Both cities were considered to be located at the northern end 
of what was characterized as the “Sunni Triangle,” a region thought to be the heart of the 
insurgency. The cities in the “Sunni Triangle” particularly susceptible to violence had 
multiethnic populations, which added to the complexity of the SBCT’s operational 
environment. Mosul and Tal Afar were counted among those cities that fit that 
multiethnic profile. During the operations of the 101st ABD, 3/2 SBCT and the 1/25 
SBCT, those forces had to confront a combination of indigenous insurgents and foreign 
terrorist groups—both adapted to U.S. tactics over time. The SBCTs and other U.S. 
military units were assigned to stabilize the region, restore critical services, and help to 




Figure 11.   Map of the provinces of Northern Iraq (From: Rand Corporation, 2007) 
 
 
Figure 12.   Map of Ninawah Province Iraq (From: Rand Corporation, 2007) 
The 101st ABD served in northern Iraq through the major engagements of the war 
until November 2003, when the 3/2 SBCT was deployed as their replacements in some 
provinces, although their presence did overlap. By January 2004, the 3/2 SBCT moved 
into the north to replace the 101st ABD fully. The 1/25 SBCT arrived in northern Iraq in 
October 2004 and remained through 2005. 
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During the deployment periods of both SBCTs, their performance was rated as 
highly effective (Gonzales et al., 2007), and the findings from the CERTEX case study 
were supported again in this environment in that the SBCTs showed greater agility, 
adaptability and innovation than the 101st ABD as outlined by the Rand report. One such 
example of the SBCT characteristics was an incident involving a helicopter crash in the 
city of Tal Afar in September 2004. 
The city of Tal Afar is located in the Ninawah province in northwest Iraq near the 
Syrian border. A well-traveled highway leading into Iraq from Syria traverses the city. In 
2004, when the insurgency began to gain momentum, a significant number of foreign 
fighters entered the country to join the jihad, and that highway became their common 
route. Tal Afar was, therefore, ripe for skirmishes between U.S. forces and insurgents. As 
this was a relatively new phenomenon and intelligence reports in the region were 
intermittent, only a small presence of the 3/2 SBCT were in the city. 
The 3/2 SBCT had begun a series of high-value target (HVT) missions in the city 
using a battalion-strength task force from its 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment (5-20 
Task Force). High-value target missions are generally efforts to search for and capture or 
kill insurgent leaders or members critical to the group (Frankel, 2011). The operations in 
the Ninawah province were collectively known as “Operation Assyrian Drifter,” which 
began on September 3, 2004. On September 4, the 5-20 task force entered Tal Afar to 
conduct three simultaneous HVT search operations. The task force was comprised of a 
Stryker company, scout platoon, and a company of Iraqi National Guard troops, who 
operated in pick-up trucks without the benefit of the armor protection that the Stryker 
vehicle offered its soldiers. The scout platoon received its surveillance reports from two 
OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopters and a UAV patrolling overhead. 
Initially, the operation was on track, but then at 8:50 a.m., one of the helicopters 
sustained an RPG hit and went down. The 5-20 task force commanders had to abandon 
the unfolding operations to address this sudden change of events. The rapid response and 
retasking of resources would test the SBCT’s organizational characteristics of agility and 
adaptability. The crash location was immediately verified over the radio by the battalion 
commander and also through the use of the SBCT’s sophisticated digital computer 
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network that linked with systems onboard the helicopter. Since the SBCT’s digital 
networking capabilities were so robust and ubiquitous among the various brigade 
elements, the Stryker vehicles and scout platoon also had the information almost 
immediately. The scout platoon was at the crash site in less than five minutes and quickly 
loaded the helicopter crew into the Stryker medical evacuation vehicle. 
Unfortunately, the story did not end there. The next three hours would present the 
3/2 SBCT with a highly unstable, dynamic and complex environment, and the threat of 
extensive loss of life. UAV surveillance revealed approximately 60 insurgents moving 
toward the site. The scout platoon was almost immediately overwhelmed during an 
intense 20-minute firefight involving a large and growing concentration of insurgents 
armed with RPGs, machine guns, and variety of other firearms. Outnumbered three to 
one, the platoon requested reinforcements. 
Bravo Company was sent to reinforce the west side of the crash site and assist the 
scout platoon, but immediately encountered hostile fire from enemy positions. They 
headed south along the small roads and alleys of the city in an attempt to arrive at the 
crash site and prevent the scout platoon from being overrun. The twisted route necessary 
to get there required heading first south, then east, and finally north in a complicated and 
circuitous maneuver. The challenges faced by Bravo Company were eerily similar to the 
Battle of Mogadishu during the now famous “Blackhawk Down” incident. As Bravo 
Company made its way through the maze, the number of insurgents increased, as did the 
intensity of the incoming fire from the variety of weapons. Insurgents occupied buildings 
and rooftops, and used high ground positioning to their advantage. One platoon had come 
to a complete stop, not able to continue under the pressure of such heavy fire. Another 
platoon had a disabled Stryker vehicle that had been hit with RPG fire. 
The Bravo Company commander made several adjustments to his battle plan 
based on the perceived need to adapt to the changing conditions. He called for close air 
support and stopped the column’s forward progress to reroute the approach. This change 
allowed the pinned-down platoon time to break free from the insurgent attack and rig the 
Stryker vehicle for towing. The company finally arrived at the crash site, but the 
circuitous route and intense fighting to arrive there left them on the eastern edge of the 
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site instead of the western perimeter where they were needed. They could not cross the 
open town square to reach the western edge of the site because of insurgent RPG and 
mortar fire. UAV surveillance revealed 20 additional insurgents entering the combat zone 
with more RPGs and machine guns. 
The battalion commander coordinated with the scout platoon leader to devise a 
plan so they could secure the entire site perimeter. The battalion commander then 
requested a Joint Direct Attack-Munitions (JDAM) strike on the enemy positions by an 
in-bound F-16 aircraft. The Bravo Company commander quickly adapted his plan to 
account for the impending JDAM strike, which included taking possession of four 
buildings on the western edge of the crash site immediately after the JDAM blast. The 
plans of the various leaders had to be adapted to keep pace with the battle tempo and with 
minimal consultation. The digital connectivity and decision authority given to the 
company commanders allowed for this agility. Bravo Company’s commander was taking 
full advantage of the SBCT’s digital networking capabilities and the SBCT 
organizational doctrine to maintain his company’s momentum against unfavorable and 
complex conditions, which was the epitome of ambiguous environment.  
After the JDAM strike, the lead platoon of Bravo Company maneuvered to the 
western edge of the crash site, as Bravo soldiers cleared the four pivotal buildings that 
overlooked the location, which ensured an effective perimeter defense for the site. The 
flight crew was evacuated, and the helicopter was eventually loaded onto a truck and 
removed from the site, all of which was accomplished under heavy fire. 
At the conclusion of the three-hour battle, 110 insurgents were found dead and it 
was suspected that they had sustained a significant number of wounded, but this 
information was not confirmable. No U.S. soldiers were killed and only five were 
wounded. One Iraqi National Guardsmen was killed and two were wounded. 
The Rand report analyzed the performance of the 3/2 SBCT during the battle of 
Tal Afar to account for its success and minimal casualties. The digital networking 
capabilities of the SBCT were highlighted as a significant factor in allowing commanders 
to use real-time information to adapt battle plans and maintain situational awareness. The 
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report also cited the Bravo Company commander for the decisions made under adverse 
conditions, the speed of command, and the rapid dissemination of plans to company 
personnel. The scout platoon’s rapid movement to the crash site initially was also listed 
as critical. Company commanders were praised for deploying necessary resources and 
executing plans “…despite not explicitly being told what equipment to bring and what to 
do at the crash site” (p. 89). 
As in the CERTEX case study, the SBCT’s organizational doctrine of 
decentralized decision authority, peer-to-peer interaction and broad distribution of critical 
information accounted for agility, adaptability and responsiveness, which are hallmarks 
of organic design. The Rand report listed similar findings throughout the deployment of 
the 3/2 and the 1/25 SBCT’s tour of duty in northern Iraq. Earlier that year (2004), the 
3/2 SBCT provided another example of superior agility, adaptability and responsiveness, 
but not in northern Iraq. The 3/2 SBCT was abruptly called out of its area of operation to 
support other U.S. forces under attack. During the SBCT deployment period, insurgents 
had mounted impressive counterattacks against U.S. forces in Najaf and Fallujah, which 
had to be reinforced. 
In April 2004, the 3/2 SBCT had to partially halt operations in the north and send 
a battalion—again it was the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment (5-20)—to Najaf to 
support the 1st Armored Division. The 3/2 SBCT sent the 5-20 group on a mission that 
included disengaging from its current combat operations and traveling 600 miles in two 
days. The agility of the 5-20 was evident because it had just fought in several major 
battles and had to retask resources to make the journey to Najaf, and it had to reroute 
several times along the way to respond to the movements of insurgent forces. On April 
11, the 5-20 had to stop to deal with an IED attack, and yet it made it to a forward 
operating base on schedule. The battalion commander used his authority to change the 
plan and split the force into two separate teams. One team traveled on a western route 
around and through Baghdad. The other team followed an eastern route and immediately 
came under attack. It was hit with IEDs, RPGs, and heavy automatic weapons fire at the 
Tigris River Bridge. Unfortunately, the enemy forces had disabled the bridge, so the team 
had to adapt and move quickly to secure the bridge at Al Kut. By splitting the battalion 
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into two teams, the commander ensured that the mission would stay on schedule to get 
reinforcements to the objective as planned. The tactic worked well and the two teams 
eventually reunited and secured another bridge at the Euphrates. The 5-20 arrived in 
Najaf, having traveled over 600 miles in under 48 hours, with only one soldier killed 
during the journey. The Rand report described the movement of mechanized forces over 
this huge distance in such a short period of time and with so few losses as, 
“unprecedented” (p. 73). The report highlighted the digital technology and adaptive 
nature of the SBCT as significant contributions to its success (p. 73). 
The Rand report surveyed unit leaders from the 3/2 SBCT, 1/25 SBCT, and 101st 
ABD to evaluate performance and collaboration. The 3/2 SBCT performance was rated 
very high for conducting major combat operations, accelerated planning and battle 
tempo, reacting to enemy attacks and changes in the environment. The 3/2 also had 
extremely low casualty rates. The force agility, adaptability, responsiveness, and 
innovation found during the CERTEX case study were evident in the 3/2 SBCT in Iraq. 
Its performance in the political stability operations portion of the mission was not rated as 
well. The 1/25 SBCT and 101st ABD significantly outperformed the 3/2 in the stability 
mission, which was attributed to additional resources provided to the 1/25 SBCT and the 
101st ABD, and some specific challenges faced by 3/2 that the other units did not 
encounter. 
The 1/25 SBCT also showed significant speed and agility during offensive 
operations, and responsiveness to enemy attacks, but it also performed very well in the 
stability operations. The 1/25 SBCT demonstrated that it could quickly redirect personnel 
to address emerging opportunities without the necessity of much advance planning. The 
1/25 SBCT also showed surprising success during HVT and counter infiltration 
operations. At one point, it captured key insurgent leaders in Mosul, provided security for 
voters at polling sites, and reestablished political dialog between various ethnic groups. 
The 1/25 SBCT was largely credited for the return of political stability to Mosul 
(Gonzales et al., 2007). 
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Figure 13.   Stryker Armored Vehicle (From: http://www.ausa.org, 2006) 
C. CONCLUSION 
Examination of the case studies revealed some consistent themes related to why 
and how organic organizations perform well in unstable, dynamic and complex 
environments. Many of these themes correlated with similar themes that emerged from 
the synthesis of the literature. Mintzberg (1979), and Alberts and Nissen (2009) 
emphasized the importance of liaisons to provide horizontal or lateral linkages between 
organizational subunits and also among organizations collaborating in pursuit of a 
common objective. These linkages facilitate the movement of critical and timely 
information through an organization or among various organizations to those who need it. 
Mintzberg called these “liaison devices” (1979, pp. 161–162). The case studies of 
Operation Talavera, Operation Chimera, and the DNC 2000 all had examples of the TEW 
making extensive use of liaisons to improve performance and function more organically. 
During Operation Talavera, a critical liaison was the exchange of personnel between the 
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TEW and the FBI. During Chimera, the TEW’s Epi-Intel Cell Leader was embedded in 
the TAG. The terrorism liaison officers were a critical lateral link in all of the case 
studies involving the TEW. The extensive use of liaisons supports greater levels of peer-
to-interaction and broad distribution of information (Alberts & Nissen, 2009). 
During Operation Chimera, the TEW combined the epi-intel cell with the 
analysis/synthesis cell, which changed the organizational structure. Flexible 
organizational structure correlates to another common theme in the literature (Alberts & 
Hayes, 2003, p. 139; Tushman & Nadler, 1978, p. 621; Mintzberg, 1979, p. 433). 
Flexibility emerged in the literature as a central characteristic of organic forms and was 
said to contribute to its performance in ambiguous environments. The TEW’s complete 
integration of one organizational subunit into another to fit the situation is an extreme 
example of flexibility. TEW’s performance during Chimera produced another observable 
phenomenon that correlated with the literature on organic design, which was emergent 
leadership (Alberts & Hayes, 2003). When the TEW allowed its epi-intel cell to take the 
lead for the operation because of the fit between the functional discipline of the cell and 
the environment, the organization demonstrated that it could perform at a high level of 
effectiveness in a dynamic and complex environment. 
In the CERTEX case study, the SBCT allowed its subordinate commanders to 
adapt the battle plan around new information to avoid a direct confrontation with enemy 
forces and accelerate the timetable. These changes led to a decisive victory and proved to 
be the pivotal engagement of the exercise. This course of events epitomized the SBCT’s 
doctrine of decentralized decision authority, and significantly contributed to 
organizational performance. Decentralized decision rights are a central feature of organic 
forms and the literature highlights this variable as a necessary feature for success in 
dynamic and complex environments (Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 273–281; Alberts & Nissen, 
2009). This organizational characteristic was also at work in the northern Iraq case study 
during the downed helicopter incident in Tal Afar, and when battalion commanders split 
the force on the way to Najaf. The SBCTs also demonstrated an important characteristic 
of organic organization that contributed to high performance—innovation—with its use 
of sophisticated digital communication networking technology. Technology not only 
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provided innovation for the SBCTs, but also acted as a liaison in a sense, establishing 
strong and reliable lateral linkages for the rapid and accurate dissemination of 
information. Complexity presents challenges, but also offers opportunities if an 
organization can leverage innovation. In the case of the SBCTs, the technology provided 
that opportunity. 
Organic design features that contributed to superior operational performance 
during the case studies included the extensive use of liaisons, emergent leadership, 
decentralized decision authority, peer-to-peer interaction, broad distribution of 
information, and the use of innovative technology. The SBCTs and the TEW performed 
well in dynamic and complex environments because they ultimately exhibited 
organizational characteristics including agility, responsiveness, flexibility, adaptability, 
and innovation. These characteristics are restated repeatedly in the literature as central to 
organic design and critical in dynamic and complex environments. 
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V.  DATA ANALYSIS 
The aim of this research was to seek an understanding of why and how organic 
organizational designs perform well in unstable, dynamic and complex environments, but 
the project did not begin with this specific objective in mind. Qualitative social research 
can at times be chaotic, and organizing that chaos becomes the journey through which the 
researcher must travel. During such a journey, unexpected information and conclusions 
are not uncommon. Data emerge from a wide variety and sometimes, unexpected sources, 
which then requires a blend of synthesis methodology that is systematic, scientific, and 
yet somewhat thematic if not a bit interpretive. This research was no different. A simple 
question of whether a networked organization would outperform a hierarchy in a complex 
environment, evolved into a much wider view of organic designs versus mechanistic 
ones, and ultimately, led to asking why and how, which are not easy questions to 
consider. 
In the course of this journey, some realities had to be taken into account. The 
nature of case study research does not lend itself to repeatable experiments, nor does it 
typically involve limited sets of variables that can be easily controlled out of the analysis. 
In fact, the case studies encompassed in this research in particular were immersed in 
complex and dynamic environments and involved several complex organizations, in 
which many variables simply could not be separated from the analysis. Time constraints 
for completion of the research collided with the human subjects institutional review 
requirements (IRB). The IRB process would have taken valuable research time to 
complete. Given the huge amount of written data that had to be collected and analyzed, 
not enough time remained to pursue all of the available sources of data; therefore, human 
subject interviews had to be dropped from the research plan. This omission was a 
difficult decision considering the richness that those interviews could have added to such 




This analysis was based upon a combination of a thorough review of related 
documents, published secondary material, extensive personal experience, some direct 
participation and observation, and in some cases, informal conversations with participants 
going back several years prior to the start of this research. From this amalgam of 
information, a picture began to emerge. This picture was messy at times, and ultimately, 
required distillation using a series of progressive scales developed from an understanding 
of the salient points in the organization and management literature. The distilled thematic 
variables that emerged were then considered against the narratives of the cases in an 
effort to answer the questions of why and how organic organizational forms perform 
effectively in unstable, dynamic, and complex environments. 
A. DISTILLATION PROCESS 
The first step in this distillation process was to examine the literature for some 
common, but generally broad characteristics that suggest an organization is oriented more 
toward the organic end of the continuum than the mechanistic. Once these characteristics 
were identified, a scale was developed to assess the presence or absence of each during 
all the case studies, and therefore, develop a qualitative measure of the organization’s 
design orientation in the context of the specific case. The next step in the analysis was to 
determine if the organizations were effective during the case studies using some 
reasonably objective criteria, which was established with a series of yes or no questions. 
Next, the analysis attempted to separate the individual elements of the organic 
organizations that contributed to their effectiveness—the “how.” This separation was 
accomplished by matching organizational elements with those identified in the literature. 
The OMT literature has identified a well-established set of organizational elements that 
contribute to design. These elements can be assessed based on three overall thematic 
variables (Alberts & Nissen, 2009). 
 Allocation of decision rights 
 Patterns of interaction 
 Distribution of information 
Alberts and Hayes (2003) emphasized agility as a fundamental characteristic of 
organic organizational forms, and an important quality for organizations operating in the 
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Information Age (pp. 56, 123). Agility was a characteristic that surfaced repeatedly in the 
literature as common to organic design, and as a distinct advantage in dynamic and 
complex environments (Daft, 2009, pp. 25–30, Bell & Joroff, 2001, p. 10; Alberts, 2010). 
Responsiveness, or the capacity to respond to and exploit opportunities quickly, is 
another characteristic commonly associated with organic design. The related 
characteristics of flexibility—the capacity to meet objectives using various methods, 
adaptability—the capability to modify tactics to meet changing conditions, and 
innovation—the capacity to utilize new techniques, resources and technologies all 
emerge as salient within organic organizations and critical in complex environments 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2003, pp. 141–151). The following characteristics provide a basic 
definition used for this analysis. 
 Agility—The organization quickly shifts priorities and resources to 
manage dynamic and evolving environments. Agility implies a nimbleness 
of movement or easily redirected momentum. 
 Responsiveness—The organization responds to and exploits emerging 
and unexpected opportunities to meet its objectives. Responsiveness 
implies a timely reaction to environmental change. 
 Flexibility—The organization can and does change strategies, tactics and 
even team composition to adjust to changing domains. This characteristic 
leverages multiple methods to reach success and the ability to shift 
between those methods. 
 Adaptability—The organization modifies tactics to meet rapidly changing 
demands and challenges. The organization can even modify its form to 
meet challenges. 
 Innovation—The organization uses novel techniques, technologies and 
resources to meet objectives, which implies either something new or 
something old, but achieved in some new way. 
The scale used to assess the presence or absence of each of these characteristics 
was based on a numeric value between 1–10, with 1 being the least organic and 10 being 
the most. 
1-2 = Never associated with the organization 
3-4 = Rarely, but sometimes associated with the organization 
5-6 = Occasionally, but not consistently associated with the organization 
7-8 = Consistently, but not always associated with the organization  










Agility 3 8 8 9 
Responsiveness 4 9 9 10 
Flexibility 2 8 10 8 
Adaptability 3 9 10 9 
Innovative 4 8 9 9 
Table 1.   Organizational Characteristics of Intelligence and Emergency Responder 









Agility 9 8 9 9 
Responsiveness 9 8 9 9 
Flexibility 7 4 7 7 
Adaptability 9 6 9 9 
Innovative 10 5 10 10 
Table 2.   Organizational Characteristics of Military Organizations (From: 3/2 
SBCT, 1/25 SBCT and 101st ABD) 
All of the organic organizations scored high in agility across the spectrum of 
cases in this research, since all of them had opportunities to adjust and change 
momentum in the face of new information, and did so with relative ease. The TEW score 
particularly high for flexibility and adaptability during Operation Chimera because it 
actually integrated one entire team into another and changed its organizational structure 
to address the environment. In Chimera, the nature of the threat, which was 
epidemiological, required the TEW to demonstrate flexibility of form, emergent 
leadership, adaptability, and a general responsiveness to the conditions on the ground. 
TEW also scored high on responsiveness during the DNC 2000 because it assessed the 
changing tactics of the protest groups, disseminated that information and suggested 
countermeasures. The SBCTs scored consistently high on innovation during the 
CERTEX and operations in northern Iraq because of their extensive use of advanced 
digital technologies to enhance communication, coordination and synchronization. The 
networking systems they employed are highly innovative and contributed heavily to their 
strong performance. 
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Alternatively, the operations section during Operation Talavera scored 
particularly low on flexibility because the strict hierarchy and rigid, formalized chain-of-
command failed to address changing conditions in the environment, which led to 
communication breakdowns. Flexibility was also a weakness of the 101st ABD during 
operations in Iraq, which led to a lengthened attack planning cycle and impacted its 
agility. The ABD’s use of analog radio communications technology during the operations 
in Iraq degraded its ability to communicate and share information, which slowed its 
ability to react to changes in the environment. For this reason, the 101st ABD scored low 
on innovation. 
The next step in the analysis was to determine if the organizations were effective 
during the case studies using some reasonably objective criteria, even though 
“effectiveness” is an inherently subjective quality to evaluate. The criteria included the 
following considerations, which were gleaned from the literature (Alberts & Hayes, 
2003). 
 Mission Objectives—Were the objectives of the operation reasonably 
met? 
 Information Speed—Did the speed of information flow meet the 
demands of the dynamic and complex environment? 
 Information Quality—Was the information accurate? Did the 
information add to overall performance? 
 Convert Information to Action—Was the information quickly converted 
into action in support of the operational objectives? 
 Organizational Learning—Did organizational learning occur? 
 Shared Situation Awareness—Did the organization achieve shared 
situational awareness or a “common operating picture?” 
 Decision Quality—Did the decisions of leadership lead to positive 
outcomes? 
 Self-Synchronization—Did the organization synchronize its activities? 
The TEW and the SBCT did meet their stated operational objectives for each of 
the cases, as documented in the data sources. In the case studies involving the TEW, the 
after action reports emphasized that objectives were achieved. It was determined through 
the totality of the data that the TEW also fulfilled the remaining criteria, with the 
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exception of organizational learning, which could not be determined from the data. The 
secondary source materials published by Rand from the CERTEX and northern Iraq case 
studies on the SBCTs specifically discussed all of the criteria, and the reports reflected 
that they successfully met all of the established objectives to demonstrate operational 
effectiveness in the environment. The Rand reports rated information accuracy as high 
based on interviews conducted for the report. The SBCTs did convert information into 
action quickly and efficiently, which was evident in their accelerated attack planning 
cycles and the “information advantage” that enabled them to outmaneuver and surprise 
enemy forces. They also established shared situational awareness and achieved self-
synchronization. Conversely, the operations section did not meet all of its objectives 
during Operation Talavera, and information was slow to reach those that needed it, which 
impacted effectiveness. Information speed was also a concern for the 101st ABD in Iraq. 
The information lag slowed its attack planning cycle when compared to the 3/2 SBCT 
and the 1/25 SBCT. 
The next analysis step was to attempt to separate some of the individual elements 
of the organic organizations that particularly contributed to their effectiveness—the 
“how.” Matching observed elements during the case studies to the literature helped this 
process. The OMT literature has identified a set of organizational elements that 
contribute to design (Galbraith, 1973; Galbraith, 1977; Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg, 
1980; Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). These elements include the 
following. 
 Centralization—The degree to which power and control are concentrated 
within a central command structure, or distributed out to subordinate 
commanders or even line level personnel. 
 Specialization—The degree to which division of labor is utilized to 
accomplish goals. Vertical specialization refers to specific duties 
delegated down through the chain of command and horizontal 
specialization refers to division of tasks by function. 
 Formalization—The degree that work is formally defined through written 
manuals or procedures. 
 Use of Liaison Devices—People or processes that create lateral linkage 
for horizontal interaction and communication. 
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 Planning and Control Systems—The degree to which planning and 
control are predetermined specifically or guided by intent and outcome. 
Action planning or the process to predetermine what steps will be taken is 
at one end of this spectrum of measurement and performance controls or 
the regulation of performance to attain overall objectives is at the other. 
 Emergent Leadership—The degree to which subordinate leaders, 
individuals or specialized teams were allowed to take the lead to address a 
particular problem set or challenging aspect of the environment. 
With the exception of emergent leadership, which was added as a critical element 
in this research, Alberts and Nissen (2009) developed a series of matrices to assess the 
aforementioned elements and apply them to each of three thematic variables, allocation 
of decision rights, patterns of interaction, and distribution of information. They plotted 
these results on a three-dimensional model referred to as a “Metaphorical Rosetta Stone” 
(pp. 39–45). The three variables were plotted along three corresponding axes to depict 
visually where an organization was operating in a three-dimensional space. The Alberts 
and Nissen Rosetta Stone model and its matrices served as useful tools for this analysis. 
They were not only used here to depict the organizational orientation of the TEW and the 
SBCT as they performed during the case studies, but also to identify and define salient 
design elements that contributed to organizational effectiveness in the environment. The 
matrices and the three-dimensional model offered a more systematic method to 
corroborate anecdotal observations presented in the case study chapter and supported in 
the preliminary analysis. 
In the first matrix, the Allocation of Decision Rights (ADR) variable is separated 
by element and aligned with the organization type, using Mintzberg’s (1979) typologies, 
along with the Alberts and Hayes’ edge organizational type. TEW was depicted as more 
decentralized, less formalized and specialized than the SBCT. Their networked 
organizational structure and operating environment allowed the TEW to be more organic. 
The SBCT was generally organized as a hierarchy and maintained a chain of command 
consistent with military organizations, but with the ability to flex into a more organic 
orientation as the environment became more dynamic and complex. The SBCT was, 
therefore, depicted as a more balanced organization when viewed through the ADR lens. 
The subordinate commanders sometimes followed pre-designed plans and sometimes 
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adapted their plans to fit the overall command intent, but with no particular specifics as to 
how to achieve the objective. Although supported in both organizations, emergent 
leadership was more prevalent in the TEW than the SBCT. Emergent leadership allowed 
for periodic shifts as to which subordinate leader or team took the operational lead 
consistent with their expertise, geographic location relative to the mission, or a range of 
other deciding factors. 
 
 Machine Simple Professional Adhocracy Edge 
ADR Unitary Mostly 
Unitary 
Balanced Mostly P2P P2P 
TEW     X  
SBCT    X   
Centralization High High Low Low Low 
TEW     X  
SBCT    X   
Vertical 
Specialization 
High High Low Low Low 
TEW     X  
SBCT    X   
Horizontal 
Specialization 
High Low High High Low 
TEW      X 





Neutral Supported Well 
Supported 
TEW      X 
SBCT     X  
Formalization High Low Low Low Low 
TEW     X  
SBCT    X   
Table 3.   Matrix of Elements Associated with the Allocation of Decision 
Rights/Based on Concept by Alberts and Nissen  
(From: Alberts & Nissen, 2009) 
When breaking down Patterns of Interaction (POI) as a design variable, the TEW 
was assessed to be unconstrained, with organization members and cells (teams) 
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interacting with almost no restrictions. The SBCT was mostly unconstrained, but any 
military organization would find it difficult to operate with no interaction restrictions. 
The SBCT followed a basic chain-of-command, but allowed for some peer-to-peer and 
multi-echelon interaction, which was facilitated by the use of the digital technology. Both 
organizations operated in the case studies with low formalization, but to varying degrees. 
Finally, both the TEW and SBCT made extensive use of liaisons and mixed action 
planning with performance control. 
 
 Machine Simple Professional Adhocracy Edge 





TEW      X 
SBCT     X  
Formalization High Low Low Low Low 
TEW     X  
SBCT    X   
Liaison 
Devices 
Few Few Some Many Many 
TEW      X 






Little Little Some Action Performance 
Control 
TEW     X  
SBCT     X  
Table 4.   Matrix of Elements Associated with the Patterns of Interaction/Based on 
Concept by Alberts and Nissen (From: Alberts & Nissen, 2009) 
The Distribution of Information (DOI) varied from mostly uncontrolled to 
uncontrolled in both organizations, but for different reasons. The TEW utilized its 
networked system of cells or teams to move information with little or no restriction. They 
also consistently used the TLOs as liaisons. The SBCT used some liaison positions and 
embedded personnel to move information, but it was the almost instantaneous 
dissemination of information through their advanced digital communication network that 
had the greatest impact on operational effectiveness. Therefore, it was established they 
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both used liaisons extensively, but the SBCT used its technology as a liaison device. Both 
the TEW and SBCT mixed action planning with performance control. The SBCT used 
specific plans to map out mission objectives and the specific tasks to accomplish those 
objectives, but also allowed for performance controls or the adaptation of the original 
plan within the command intent to meet objectives without a specific set of directives to 
mandate how those objectives were met. The decision whether to follow established 
plans or adapt was situational and greatly dictated by the complexity of the environment. 
 
 Machine Simple Professional Adhocracy Edge 





TEW     X  
SBCT      X 
Liaison 
Devices 
Few Few Some Many Many 
TEW      X 






Little Little Some Action Performance 
Control 
TEW     X  
SBCT     X  
Table 5.   Matrix of Elements Associated with the Distribution of Information/Based 
on Concept by Alberts and Nissen (From: Alberts & Nissen, 2009) 
Using the Rosetta Stone model of Alberts and Nissen to plot the three thematic 
variables (ADR, POI and DOI) for the TEW and the SBCT, this analysis attempted to 
place a “value” on how organic each organization was in the case studies. This analysis is 
not a precise quantitative measurement, but a visual depiction that provides a systematic 
albeit subjective assessment of where each organization operated within the space during 
the case studies. In the first diagram (Diagram 1), the three-dimensional box shows the 
placement of a purely mechanistic organization and an edge organization as a reference. 
If an organization were at either of the extreme ends of the mechanistic-organic 
continuum, the box would look like this. The second diagram (Diagram 2) depicts the 
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relative placement of an edge organization in the space along with Mintzberg’s 
organizational types—adhocracy, professional bureaucracy, simple, and mechanistic. The 
third diagram (Diagram 3) then illustrates the placement of the TEW and the SBCT in the 
design space. The Rosetta Stone model illustrates that organizational design is not an all-
or-nothing proposition—not black and white. Very small incremental degrees of change 
to any of the three variables can move an organization toward the organic or mechanistic 
end of the continuum. When an organization changes a process or structure that impacts 
the presence or absence of one of the subelements, it also moves one of the variables, and 
in turn moves the organization’s orientation within the design space. The case studies 
demonstrate that those changes can occur even within a traditional hierarchy (SBCT) 
when the environment or some other contingency requires it, given some flexibility. The 
TEW and the SBCT certainly demonstrated that flexibility when faced with a dynamic 
and complex environment. 
 
Diagram 1. Rosetta Stone Model Depicting a Machine Bureaucracy and an Edge 
Organization/Based on Concept by Alberts and Nissen (From: Alberts 









Diagram 2. Rosetta Stone Model Depicting Mintzberg’s Organizational Types and 
an Edge Organization/Based on Concept by Alberts and Nissen (From: 
Alberts & Nissen, 2009) 
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Diagram 3. Rosetta Stone Model Depicting the SBCT and LA TEW/Based on 
Concept by Alberts and Nissen (From: Alberts & Nissen, 2009) 
B. CONCLUSION 
This research sought to explain why and how organic organizations perform well 
in unstable, dynamic and complex environments. The literature offered some clues, but 
the case studies provided an opportunity to observe real organizations operating in this 
type of environment. This study was the story of how the individuals, leaders and subunit 
(teams) of an organization adjusted their processes to exhibit a more organic form, and in 
so doing, improved performance when the environment demanded it. 
A dynamic environment is fast paced, ever changing and adapts to new 
circumstances. Little time exists to mull over information and compose elaborate plans 
based on some best practice from a prior experience. When complexity is added to the 
mix, uncertainty and unpredictability occur—decisions have to be made with less than 
ideal information and the possibility of unpredictable outcomes. This environment 
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requires an ability to first gather and move information quickly. Organic forms seem to 
provide this information speed because they do not follow a hierarchy with a centralized 
power base, in which information can be trapped in silos. Organic forms use liaisons to 
connect various subunits, which serves to optimize the movement of information further. 
The second demand of dynamic and complex environments is sense-making. It is not 
enough to simply collect and move information quickly. Decision-makers must make 
quick sense of its meaning to facilitate timely and appropriate action. The cases in this 
research demonstrated that emergent leadership, in which the individuals or teams with 
the expertise to make the best sense of a situation were allowed to assume a leadership 
role even though it might only be temporary. Organic forms seem to support the concept 
of emergent leadership so they are well positioned to make sense of dynamic and 
complex environments. Sense-making needs to be distributed across the organization so 
that all members understand what is happening, which is shared situational awareness, or 
common operating picture. Peer-to-peer interaction and broad distribution of information 
accelerate the acquisition of shared situational awareness. Since organic forms support 
peer-to-peer interaction and broad distribution of information, they seem to reach shared 
situational awareness very quickly, which acts to aid in sense-making. The final step 
involves converting information to action. At this point, an organization has collected and 
disseminated information, made sense of the situation, but now must decide what actions 
to pursue. Since dynamic environments generally offer little time for this process to occur 
before change and adaptation are added, decisions must be timely and appropriate. 
Centralized decision authority as it occurs in many traditional mechanistic organizations 
can slow decision-making. In these cases, the subordinate commanders and teams were 
given some authority to make situational decisions based on information and expertise 
possessed by those personnel. Decentralized allocation of decision rights is supported in 
organic organizations, and as is demonstrated in this research, it is useful for rapid 
conversion of information into action in dynamic and complex environments. Decision 




planning. When decisions can be guided by performance controls and command intent 
rather than specifically outlined steps or tasks, decision-makers are afforded flexibility 
often demanded in dynamic and complex environments. 
Organic forms seem to perform well in dynamic and complex environments 
because they support design features that optimize information collection and 
dissemination, and then quickly make sense of that information. They also enhance 
effectiveness in such environments because they provide decision-makers with tools to 
accelerate the conversion of information into action. Organic forms seem to be the right 
“fit” for dynamic and complex environments. 
Organic forms seem to strive for organizational agility, flexibility, adaptability 
responsiveness and innovation using elements, such as decentralization, emergent 
leadership, liaison devices, adaptive planning strategies and an emphasis on low 
formalization. Ultimately, these elements impact the three primary variables of allocation 
of decision right, patterns of interaction and distribution of information, which is how 
they seem to thrive in dynamic and complex environments. 
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VI.  FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this research support a widely accepted view in the contingency 
theory literature that no single organizational design is optimal in all situations; nor do all 
designs perform with equal effectiveness. The relationship between design and situational 
variables is critical (Galbraith, 1973, pp. 2–6; Galbraith, 1977, p. 28; Mintzberg, 1979, p. 
11). This research further supports the concept in the literature that mechanistic 
organizations provide a better fit in stable and simple environments, while organic 
designs exhibit more suitable fit in unstable, dynamic and complex environments (Burns 
& Stalker, 2001, pp. 119–125; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, p. 188; Galbraith, 1973, p. 4; 
Galbraith, 1977, pp. 28–29; Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 84–94). In the search for an explanation 
of why this is so and how it might work, the research revealed critical organizational 
characteristics, such as agility, responsiveness, flexibility, adaptability, and innovation as 
keys to both organic design and operational performance in unstable and complex 
environments. The research correlated the organizational variables of allocation of 
decision rights, patterns of interaction and distribution of information with these 
characteristics to provide further explanation of why organic designs perform well in 
unstable and complex environments. The presence of design elements, such as 
decentralized decision authority, emergent leadership, less formalization, increased use of 
liaisons, and planning and control systems that rely upon performance-based objectives 
are some of the concepts that explain how an organization can be simultaneously more 
organic and more effective in unstable and complex environments. The characteristics, 
variables and design elements found to be salient in the case studies correlated with 
concepts synthesized from the literature (Burns & Stalker, 2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967, Galbraith, 1973; Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg, 1980; Joroff, 2001; Alberts & 
Hayes, 2003; Alberts & Nissen, 2009). 
Organic organizational designs provide a better fit in unstable, dynamic and 
complex environments because they leverage three capabilities critical in these 
environments, which are communication dissemination, sense-making and timely 
conversion of information to action. Since unstable, dynamic and complex environments 
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exhibit rapid change, adaptation, uncertainty, unpredictability, and nonlinearity, they 
demand organizations that can collect and disseminate information rapidly and 
efficiently, can make sense of the situation quickly, and can convert that knowledge into 
timely and appropriate action. Since organic forms are designed with these capabilities 
integrated, they perform better in such environments than more mechanistic forms, which 
is the “why” that emerged from the research. 
Organic designs perform better by supporting the design elements that include 
decentralized decision authority, emergent leadership, low specialization, low 
formalization, the use of liaisons, and a reliance on performance controls. These elements 
contribute to the design variables that include decentralized allocation of decision rights, 
unconstrained patterns of interaction, and broad distribution of information. The variables 
support the organizational characteristics associated with organic design and superior 
performance. Figure 14 illustrates this progression, in which the elements support design 
variables that support the characteristics and contributes to the factors used to measure 
performance. Therefore, the incorporation of the design elements ultimately leads to high 
performance in unstable, dynamic and complex environments, which is the “how” that 




Figure 14.   Organizational Design Progression 
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The research offers significant opportunities for both researchers and homeland 
security leaders. The first opportunity is for further research to examine the more detailed 
aspects of these findings. The second opportunity is for public organizations either to 
reshape their design in general, or to at least, shift to a more organic orientation when the 
environment becomes more unstable and complex. 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH: INVESTIGATING THE DETAILS 
A need exists for additional research into organizational elements and their 
relationship on both organic design and operational performance in unstable and complex 
environments. The nature of case study research does not allow variables to be controlled 
out; thus, future research can be designed in a more controlled setting. In a controlled 
experiment in which all variables remain the same except one, that variable can be 
evaluated for its impact in this area. As an example, a group could be assembled to solve 
a simulated set of problems that are both complex and dynamic in nature, but one group 
can be allowed to use emergent leaders or any of the individual design elements 
identified in this research. This kind of very specific controlled experiment might help to 
add to an understanding of the particular elements being controlled, and would serve to 
validate or refute the findings in this study. 
B. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINDINGS 
Homeland security organizations can use these findings to adjust their design. 
This adjustment can be a structural change to move the design to a more organic 
orientation, or a variation of the processes to enable a better fit temporarily for an 
unstable and complex environment. Since homeland security organizations are not 
always faced with complex environments, the ability to shift design orientation to suit the 
environment has great potential. Organizations have tools, such as doctrine, leadership 
and training, to support and prepare for shifts to more organic orientation. 
1. Establishing Doctrine 
Organizations can begin by establishing a set of overarching themes for success in 
unstable and complex environments and in support of organic design—a philosophy or 
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doctrine. This formation could be used as a tool to facilitate decentralization and 
performance controls to achieve a more organic design when needed. When decision 
authority is decentralized and orders are adapted to fit unstable and complex 
environments, such a doctrine serves as a guide. The SBCT has such a doctrine. 
Commanders are given authority to execute detailed orders that support centralized 
execution or “mission-type” orders that support decentralized execution in accordance 
with command intent, based on the situation. These adapted orders can be prepared more 
quickly using specific knowledge of the terrain and general conditions. This adaptation is 
a part of the pre-designated “doctrine” of the SBCT, which also includes technological 
innovation for communication and collaboration, as well as the use of organic embedded 
specialty units to improve information distribution, and command and control. This 
doctrine supports the SBCT concept of, “see first, understand first, act first, and finish 
decisively.”  
The establishment of doctrine in support of organic design principles is more than 
just symbolic. Doctrine lays the foundation for organic design in anticipation of the 
complex environment that will signal its employment. 
2. Leadership Development 
If organic design principles are to be employed in complex environments, 
organizations must work in advance to develop leaders who are agile, adaptive, flexible 
and highly competent in ambiguous settings. These types of leaders are comfortable 
operating without specific guidance from centralized command. The SBCT has 
developed a leadership model that reflects these ideals in support of organic design 
principles. SBCT leaders are confident using innovative technologies for command and 
control, and they can make sound tactical decisions either in accord with a centralized 
plan or within the construct of command intent. The leadership philosophy of the SBCT 
blends the analytical and the creative skill sets in their leaders to drive for mission 
success through a variety of means. 
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Organic design starts with organic leadership and the characteristics of the leader 
should mirror those of the organic form. Leadership that embraces those principles, and 
has the confidence and competence to employ them, supports a doctrine of organic design 
principles. 
3. Training 
Training is a key component in the establishment of organic design principles. 
Decentralized decision authority can only be employed if subordinate commanders and 
key line personnel have the proper training to make critical decisions, which is especially 
true in unstable and complex environments. Organizations are more likely to adopt 
organic design and decentralize decision rights if they have confidence in lower-echelon 
personnel to make such decisions. The establishment of this confidence begins with 
training. The Stryker brigades rely heavily on training and simulation in similar 
environments they will face in battle to develop the ability of subordinate commanders to 
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